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 On September 24, 2011, it was announced that Putin would run for president once again 
in 2012. The reaction in the West was that ―the more things change, the more they stay the 
same.‖ The Western conception of the post-Cold War Russia is often one of remarkable 
consistency since the turn of the century. This Western narrative focuses on an autocratic Putin 
reigning over his resurgent and confrontational Russia.  Does this narrative tell the story of 
Russia today, or does it instead obscure it? To answer this I have elected to analyze Russian 
identity and how it relates to Russia‘s foreign policy with Belarus, traditionally a close ally of 
Russia. Analyzing news articles from state-owned Russia Today, I look at changes in reporting 
and Russian identity over time. I argue that a shift in Russian identity towards a more liberal 
outlook between 2006 and 2010 motivated a degradation of relations with Belarus. I argue that 
once the simplified narrative of a resurgent Russia is peeled back, a closer look reveals 
competing identities and competing interest groups in Russia‘s domestic arena. Finally I 
conclude that not only does identity play a pivotal role in Russia‘s relations, but also that 
researching identity is important in that it gives us a window into a fairly closed regime that lies 
at the center of the global stage. Discovering how Russian identity reacts to and influences 
foreign policy can offer insight into the domestic framework of contemporary Russia, as well as 
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A Different World 
 
 His world was different the last time he was here in Moscow. On December 26th, 1949, a 
reserved and servile Mao had come to Russia to celebrate Stalin‘s birthday and officially ally 
revolutionary China to the Soviet Union, expecting all the military support that came with such 
an action. Instead he had ended up locked up in a dacha for weeks on end as Stalin tested Mao‘s 
patience to gauge just how far he could push the Chinese leader. It could be said that Mao passed 
the test when he turned down the uproarious applause given to him in the Bolshoi Theater, 
instead deferring to Stalin. When the audience began to chant: ―Stalin, Mao Zedong!‖ he chose 
to reply simply with ―Long live Stalin! Glory belongs to Stalin!‖
1
  
 It was less than eight years later that Mao had returned to Moscow, arriving in November 
of 1957. Far from the servile Mao that had appeared before, what stepped off the tarmac that 
night was instead an upstart intent on usurping the role of the international leader of communism. 
When protocol demanded that communist leaders from across the world prepare written 
statements for the international meeting, it was Mao who excused himself from such chores 
when he said: ―I have no text. I want to be able to speak freely.‖
2
 Whereas other leaders from 
across the world stood and spoke, Mao chose to give his speech while comfortably seated, 
blaming a headache for preventing him from standing. When the subject of a third world war 
was broached, Mao‘s speech differed from the otherwise-standard talk of an era of socialism 
inaugurating an era of world peace:  
―Let‟s contemplate this, how many people would die if war breaks out? There are 2.7 billion 
people in the world. One-third could be lost; or, a little more, it could be half… I say that, 
taking the extreme situation, half dies, half lives, but imperialism would be razed to the ground 




It was not only a speech seemingly in praise of the benefits of world war, but also of poverty in 
general: 
“People say that poverty is bad, but in fact poverty is good. The poorer people are, the more 
revolutionary they are. It is dreadful to imagine a time when everyone will be rich… from a 
surplus of calories people will have two heads and four legs.”
3  
 
 Reagan‘s world was different the last time he was here in Berlin. A warm summer breeze 
was offset by the overcast, foreboding sky. Reagan stood before a throng of spectators waving 
American and West German flags. No doubt even within the Reagan administration there was a 
mix of tension (in that many believed the speech would be too provocative) and excitement to 
match the cacophony of the warm overcast sky, pregnant with both excitement and dread as 
Reagan spoke from behind bulletproof glass so as to deter East German snipers. When he spoke 
the four fateful words and issued his challenge to Gorbachev, ―tear down this wall‖
4
 and the 
crowd erupted in applause, it seemed as if the moment was the climax of a film just as much as a 
political career.  
 In 1987 it was a very different moment and world from when Reagan had visited Berlin 
nearly five years before (in June 11, 1982). In that world the Soviet Union was the ―evil empire‖; 
an empire asserting its dominance over Afghanistan, jailing dissenters and clamping down on 
reformists in Brezhnev‘s neo-Stalinist climate, and was racing to attain parity/supremacy in 
terms of its nuclear arms.  
 The nature of Sino-Soviet relations had vastly changed from 1949 to 1957, just as the 
nature of the US-Soviet relations had vastly changed from 1982 to 1987 at the height of glasnost 
and perestroika. The reasons behind these changes are multi-faceted and depend on the point of 
view of the analyst. Realists would state the change in US-Soviet relations came about due to the 
declining power of the Soviet Union, coupled with its inability to maintain its economy, which 
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necessitated a withdrawal of Soviet power across the globe, and Eastern Europe in particular. 
Liberals would highlight the generational shift that took place when the Brezhnevs, Andropovs, 
and Chernenkos of the country were to be gradually replaced by reform-minded leaders 
belonging to Gorbachev‘s generation. This new liberal-minded intelligentsia had captured the 
state and were mobilizing to reform the system from the top-down.  
 While these may aid in understanding the shifts in US-Soviet policy, analysis becomes 
more nebulous in the case of Sino-Soviet relations. No fundamental shift in power had taken 
place to prompt a more assertive China, nor would there be any rational reason for China and the 
Soviets to split in the face of their need to balance against the United States. In fact, Mao‘s 
stance of being in favor of war and poverty (especially when China‘s weakness is to be taken 
into account) seem to not only not be rational pursuits of power (as measured by materialism), 
but they seem to be fundamentally anti-rational and to inevitably lead to the destruction of 
China‘s interests, if not to the destruction of the Chinese state itself. Likewise, while the Stalinist 
clique (Molotov et al) was removed by Khrushchev, if we were to take a liberal account and 
analyze the political clout of both countries we would see two top-heavy communist states with 
no interest group or coalition changes to be had, as neither had a semblance of pluralism to begin 
with. Furthermore, while the liberal ―democratic peace‖ theory would state that two non-
democracies like the Soviet Union and China would eventually threaten one another, it would 
not do much to explain why the Sino-Soviet split developed precisely when it did or why they 
were allied in the first place.  
 As alluded to in the first sentence of each introduction regarding the viewpoint of both 
Mao and Reagan, these instances were not just cases of shifting power or shifting leadership, but 
rather shifting perceptions. ―The world‖ was not only objectively different between 1949 and 
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1957; it was subjectively different as well, just as the worlds of 1982 and 1987 were drastically 
different. What caused this change in perception however? Was it a byproduct of the power-
shifts central to realist theory? Was it the outcome of shifts in ruling coalitions central to liberal 
theory?  
 To explore the answer to this question it is necessary to jump ahead in time, towards the 
present day. This way perceptions can be analyzed without the benefit of cherry-picking time 
periods, and policy can be judged in terms of both how we have arrived at the present and what 
may lie ahead in the immediate future. Similarly, neither realist nor liberal theories should be 
ignored. Also, it is best to select a representative case study and to analyze a country where 
interest groups are active so as to not discount liberal theories. For this reason it makes little 
sense to analyze a totalitarian country where domestic politics and interest groups are 
nonexistent. It also makes sense to analyze a country where realist conceptions of power are 
useful, and where crucial security and economic interests are integral to the nation‘s foreign 
policy. In this instance it makes little sense to analyze a country where power is so weak as to 
necessitate an entirely subservient foreign policy.  
 For this thesis I have analyzed the foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards 
Belarus from 2006 until 2010. This allows for the ability to analyze Russia, a country that is both 
integral in international security arrangements, in addition to being a country with a variety of 
interest groups, coalitions, and, importantly, national identities. It is my assertion that the 
perception in Russia has shifted, and I seek to explain this resulting foreign policy shift in terms 
of shifts in identity. Just as the Soviet rejection of its dogmatic Stalinist identity (under 
Khrushchev) caused a rejection of a Stalinist China and eventually led to the Sino-Soviet split, so 
too can shifts in identity necessitate foreign policy shifts in today‘s Russia.  
5 
 
Contemporary Russia illustrates shifting notions of foreign policy objectives peculiar to 
the worldview of its leaders… just as Mao‘s foreign policy objectives contained the inherent 
logic of his own worldview. For example, Mao stated he would be willing to accept being struck 
by American nuclear missiles (―We are willing to endure the first strike. All it is is a big pile of 
people dying.‖
5
) if it meant China was to become a military superpower with Russia‘s assistance 
in preparation for this nuclear attack. While putting your country in nuclear crosshairs may not 
seem rational in terms of realist analysis where the state and resources (such as the people) are 
concerned, it seems to make greater sense if you are to analyze the world through the lens of 
class conflict rather than the lens of power-maximization with the state as your center of 
analysis. In this instance millions of dead in China may be beneficial if a militarized China at the 
center of a victorious-global socialist camp is the logical conclusion. While realism posits that all 
state actions are based on the maximization of interest, realist theories do little to explain what 
actually generates interest. Surely interest is far from universal, and is largely crafted by 
perceptions and identities. This is why I have elected to perform a constructivist analysis of 
Russian identity, since Russia‘s identity must be assessed if Russia‘s foreign policy (and the 
interests involved in it) is to be fully understood. 
 
The Brother States 
 
 A focus on Russian identity could be applied to any number of foreign policy decisions, 
from analyzing exactly what Russia views as its sphere of interest, to what it views as its main 
threats. This paper will focus on Russia‘s relations with Belarus. With great linguistic, cultural, 
and political similarities and shared histories Belarus seemed destined to become an ally of 
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Russia even before the Russian-leaning Lukashenko came to power in 1994. To analyze Russia‘s 
perception of Belarus, in some ways, reflects Russia‘s perception of itself… what it values, what 
it fears, and what it strives for. 
 But this was not the only reason Belarus was chosen as my focus. Unlike a country like 
Ukraine or Germany, where democratic turnover causes regime turnover, Belarus has been ruled 
since 1994 by Alexander Lukashenko, and has been dubbed by Western media as the ―last 
dictatorship of Europe.‖
6,7,8
 Lukashenko has neutralized the tendency of CIS countries to be 
involved in clan-politics (more on this later) by ruling with an iron hand and making all political 
institutions reliant solely on him. With his autocratic leadership he offers a crucial control 
variable… the variable of domestic coalitions and governments. Whereas Russian relations with 
the United States or Ukraine or Germany would involve changing dynamics due to changing 
interest groups and governments, Belarus can be analyzed without this concern since there is 
little to no democracy and its autocracy provides a relatively constant and stable unit of analysis, 
both in the form of a more or less stable Belarusian identity (maintained through repression if 
need be), and in terms of a stable partner in the form of Lukashenko, helping to neutralize the 
impact changing governments/personalities would have on Russia‘s relations with the country.  
 The identity of the autocracy in Belarus is not terribly difficult to decipher. The weakness 
of Belarusian identity was based on the de-ethnicizing principles of the Soviet experience, 
Stalinist liquidation of cultural intellectuals, Russification policies, and rapid industrialization.
9
 
Lukashenko took advantage of this weakness to replace Belarusian identity (or perhaps more 
appropriately, to meld it) with a Soviet identity. The security service is still called the KGB; the 
only intelligence service on the planet to retain the name following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Lukashenko grew up, like his father, as a collective farm boss. The collective farm 
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system has been largely kept intact. He was the only MP to oppose the Belavezha Accords in 
December of 1991
10
, which established the independence of Belarus and dissolved the Soviet 
Union. In 2002 he paved over the graves of victims of Stalinism. He chose to replace the 
Belarusian flag at the time (white-red-white in its layout) with the Soviet version of the flag once 
he came to power. He changed the day of independence from July 1990 (liberation from the 
Soviet Union) to July 1944 (liberation from Nazi occupation). The media paints Belarus as 
having retained the positive aspects of Soviet socialism and schools reintroduced Soviet-era 
textbooks and historiography. The privatization process has moved slower than in any other post-
Soviet country. He regularly paints the West (and the United States in particular) as the enemy of 
Belarus and accuses domestic opposition groups of being funded by the CIA.  He has decried the 
expansion of NATO and called it an ―insidious and horrible monster.‖
11
 Most political scientists 
would agree that Belarus exhibits the most authoritarian political climate of the European states, 
and that it exhibits the least amount of liberalism (in the classical sense) in terms of economics. 
In addressing the tendency of Poland to lean towards the West on a radio address in 2001, 
Lukashenko stated: ―Poland has become a bridgehead from which the invasion of the former 
Soviet Union advances.‖12 Lukashenko‘s style of rule and vision of Belarus as being synonymous 
with the ―former Soviet Union‖ gives insight into the neo-Soviet identity with which he controls 
Belarus. Consequently, Belarus has been described as a ―Soviet-theme park‖ which 
―establish(es) a Soviet-type model, without a Communist party.‖
13 
 While European identity revolves around democracy, Lukashenko has built an identity 
fashioned upon Slavicness and Orthodoxy (similar to today‘s Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation). This outlook has been likened to old notions of Slavophilia in that ―in essence, 
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Russia has retained what the West had lost: its soul.‖
14
 This notion was reinforced when 
Lukashenko, in a 2003 interview, stated:  
“Belarus‟s westward drift would be tantamount to breaking away from the Eastern Slavic 
civilization, where the country belongs… In the West [we] would be in the subordinate, and not 




 While Lukashenko has monopolized the media and domestic politics to portray this neo-
Soviet identity while repressing other identity discourses, Russian politics has shown a pluralism 
of competing discourses. The liberal view of Russia conceptualizes Russia as being a part of the 
West, as economic modernization as the key to success, and as the Soviet past as the aberration 
that hampered/hampers Russia‘s progress. Taking this into consideration, it is safe to assume that 
a Russian liberal would view Belarus as the way backwards rather than the way forward, and this 
premise has been put forward by scholars in the past.
16
 My hypothesis is that, as liberal identity 
would increase in Russian politics, foreign relations with Belarus would grow more 
strained/antagonistic, with the reverse occurring if liberal identity were to decrease. I seek to 
explain a key divergence in 2010 from 2006. While the Russian government made no positive 
mention of protests against Lukashenko‘s 2006 elections (which were largely considered 
fraudulent by the West) and even discredited the opposition, in the 2010 election there was a 
thorough cataloguing of everything from the opposition parties not being allowed the ability to 
set up tents, to labeling Belarus as the ―last dictatorship in Europe‖ to, perhaps most shocking of 
all, actively covering and promoting opposition candidates. To understand how this drastic 
change took place and how it relates to Russia‘s national identity, it is first necessary to discuss 





Identity And Its Measurement 
 
"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an 




There are a multitude of ways that identity can be measured.
18
 I have narrowed my focus to two 
methods that are particularly salient for this topic: 
1. Historical inquiry (elite/mass focused) – Review histories that describe identities and group 
ideas. This is useful because it illustrates important meanings over time. 
2. Frames (elite focused) – use discourse analysis to review and analyze political debates, 
memoirs of leaders, and newspaper articles that describe and/or project the ideas. This is useful 
in that it shows how they appeal to/mobilize the population.  
I have elected to focus on framing in particular. Framing is a form of content analysis that 
has been used to ―emphasize that reporting shapes the context and background used to 
comprehend and interpret the workings of government authorities, political institutions, and the 
policy process.‖
19
 A focus on framing is useful for several reasons. One is the simple fact of 
accessibility in terms of an availability of information in English. Second is that (as I will show 
later) the elite level is crucial when analyzing Russian domestic politics. Russia is a society that 
would seem, to borrow the phrasing of Michael Mann, to have a deep tradition of despotic power 
and a long history of being decidedly weaker in terms of its infrastructural power. While I will 
delve into the nature of Russia‘s domestic power later, for now I will say that Russia‘s top-heavy 
structure necessitates special attention to elite discourse, both in terms of where power resides 
and in terms of how ideas are transmitted (vertically rather than horizontally) in the context of 
Russian politics.  
10 
 
With framing as my primary method, I have elected to both analyze official statements by 
politicians (with a healthy degree of skepticism regarding the function of these statements) and to 
analyze online articles by Russia Today (RT). While a media outlet would normally be 
considered a form of analysis on the mass-level, RT is in fact owned by the government (it is 
operated by state-owned RIA Novosti) so it is a framing-analysis of the elite level. RT‘s 
reputation among the West is often as a naked tool of Kremlin propaganda.
20
 While shifting 
identity discourses may be employed by a politician simply because he intends on appealing to 
separate identity constituencies (for example, an American president may embrace the notions of 
rugged American individualism while in Texas, and not while he is campaigning in 
Massachusetts), shifting identity discourses on the part of Russia Today‘s articles could signify 
shifts in how the government (which owns Russia Today) wishes to present itself to the nation 
(or rather, ―world‖ since RT is in English) at large, and how it filters news through a specific 
identity discourse over time. This is the third reason for taking a framing-approach with regards 
to news articles. Shifts in identity on this level are much more revealing than presidential 
speeches, in that news (or ―propaganda‖ if one wishes to apply a word with a more cynical 
connotation) analysis reflects identity changes among elites over time. Fourthly, while 
presidential speeches on Belarus may reflect a use of liberal rhetoric simply to attack the 
decidedly illiberal Belarus (and likewise for Russia Today articles), looking at Russia Today 
articles that are entirely separate from Belarus (for example, day-to-day international reporting) 
can reflect shifts in identity that are not at all connected to foreign policy rhetoric. This is why 
my analysis will center on wide swathes of reporting that is entirely unrelated to Belarus, lest I 
tautologically arrive at the conclusion that liberal-rhetoric-attacking-Belarus implies that a liberal 
identity shift causes attacks to be made on Belarus. When analyzing framing I have chosen to 
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look at (non-Belarus) articles from two periods: December 2006 and then December 2010, 
coinciding with the presidential election in Belarus. I have selected all news stories (310 from 
2006, 196 from 2010) from both periods to analyze in terms of how often statements are made 
that coincide with a specific discourse. If identity is merely used as a rhetorical device liberal 
attacks on Belarus might increase in 2010 while liberal constructs remain the same when it 
comes to non-Belarus reporting. If, however, liberal discursive formations either fall or rise in 
non-Belarus stories we can assume a fundamental shift in how Russia Today (the Russian 
government) presents itself to the public, and through that what discursive formations it is 
choosing to communicate its messages.  
However, there are two publics that the Russian state is presenting itself to. The first is 
the diaspora and the international community (RT in English) whereas there is the domestic 
audience in Russia. In order to see if there is any difference between the two presentations I have 
also looked at Russian-language articles from RIA Novosti (93 articles from December of 2006 
and 90 articles from December of 2010). Google translate was used so that the articles could be 
analyzed in English. RIA Novosti owns RT and of course is state-owned as well, so if there is no 
difference between the two mediums one can expect RT and RIA Novosti to reflect similar 
trends in identity statements. If, however, there is a significant deviation between the two the 
research can offer insight into how RT differs from articles intended for a domestic audience.  
On the other hand, to qualify the nature of statements themselves, I rely on historical 
inquiry. In particular I have depended on notions of Russian identity discursive formations put 
forward by Tsygankov and Hopf.
21
 I borrow from their research about classifications of Russian 
identity to determine how to classify statements according to which discursive formations they 
fit into (if they fit into any at all that is). I have also elected to ignore certain statements that 
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some may be tempted to include as indicative of identity-associations. For example, one might 
be tempted to include anti-corruption rhetoric as an indication of liberalism. However, Hopf has 
shown there are a few unanimous agreements on positions across the identity spectrum: a 
universal opposition to corruption and favoritism, arbitrary police power, state atheism, Stalinist 
terror and a universal supporting of ideological heterogeneity, concern for the next generation, 
achieving Great Power status, and promoting mass culture.
22
 Since a statement in favor of 
attaining Great Power status or combating corruption could reflect any identity, it makes little 
sense to qualify it as indicative of any particular identity. Likewise, I have ignored other 
―universal‖ statements as they are explained above by Hopf. What I can use, however, are 
indications where there are significant differences in terms of identity.  For instance, positive 
appraisals of the middle class and the intelligentsia are unique to liberal identities.
23
 It is for this 
reason that I include some instances of rhetoric as an indication of more liberal identities. Below 
is a table of the two identities I will be analyzing in terms of their prevalence in RT articles:  
Table 1: International Relations Rhetorical Focuses of the Two Dominant Identities 
 
Identity group National Democrats (liberal) Statists (realist) 
Rhetorical focus  multipolarity in the 
context of international 
institutions  
 economic 
modernization as a 
method of promoting 






 mutual security 
 cooperation with the 
West 
 multipolarity in the 
context of national 
interests & sovereignty 
 economic 
modernization as a 
method of overtaking 
other states 
 prioritization on social 
stability  
 pragmatism in politics 
 materialism as a 
determinant in foreign 
relations 




In the next section I will discuss exactly what the differences are between these two identity 
groups, the identity formations prevalent in Russia according to Tsygankov and Hopf, and why I 
chose these two particular groups while omitting others from my analysis.  
 
Identity in Russia 
 
"Nowhere is there a defining issue or priority, something that pulls us all together, 
focuses our thinking, clarifies the present and the future, provides consensus on 
where the world goes from here. Confusion prevails. There is no new order, only 
disorder" – Pitzl  
 
The above quote was given at a time (1997) when Russian identity was at a crossroads. 
The liberal period of the early 1990s was fading. By 1998 Westernizing liberalism had failed in 
the form of the economic collapse on the home front, and it diplomatically failed on the 
international front in the form of NATO‘s eastern expansion and subsequent invasion of 
Yugoslavia. Westernizers as a dominant discourse effectively ceased to exist by the end of the 
1990s. Before this collapse individuals such as President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev could be classified as liberal Westernizers.  
As a social construction, types of identity are dependent on the societies from which they 
emanate. In the case of Russian identity the same applies. In order to understand Russian 
identities it is important to understand the society they are a part of. It is for this reason that 
pinpointing the right set of discursive formations (to borrow a term from Foucault) for Russian 
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Tsygankov divides Russian identity into five primary discourses and three primary 
groups, situating them across a spectrum of the most pro-Western (Westernizers) to the most 
anti-Western (Eurasianists). The most Western-friendly is that of the (aptly titled) Westernizers, 
to be followed by National Democrats (which Gorbachev is classified as), to be followed by 
Statists (which he describes Putin as), to be followed by National Communists and 
Eurasianists.
24
 This categorization is similar to Ross‘s use of categorizing identity based on three 
groups: liberal-Atlanticists, centrists like Putin, and Eurasianists where Ross oddly includes both 
former Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and military leaders since the latter seek to justify 
tension with the West in order to support the continuance of a military-trading regime with 
developing and undemocratic countries.
25
 
             The first primary group (to which the Westernizers and National Democrats belong) is 
the group of integrationists/liberals. When this school peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the notions of ―mutual security‖ and ―interdependence‖ were key themes echoed in policy 
statements, in addition to notions of multilateralism and cooperation.
26
 The policies of 
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integrationists under Gorbachev strengthened under Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Kozyrev.  
For example, Tsygankov noted that: 
―Andrei Kozyrev, stated that with the end of the Cold War Russia was no longer threatened 
from abroad. They announced that Russia would engage in a partnership with the West based 
on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a free market. The Western countries, 
it was claimed, were „natural allies of Russia‟”27 
 
            Under this schema, when Kozyrev said ―foreign policy is a tool for advancing Russia‘s 
reforms,‖
27
 foreign policy was essentially an exercise in exorcising the domestic Other (Soviet 
backwardness and non-Westerness) from the body politic of Russia. Tsygankov marked the 
decline of this school as being the result of challenges which liberalism could not explain. These 
included the military conflicts within the Russian periphery (such as Chechnya), the continuing 
eastward expansion of NATO despite Russia‘s Western stance, and the ongoing conflicts in the 
Balkans. When their ―grand strategy involving the development of a deep, multisided partnership 
with the West had turned out to be flawed‖ it necessitated the need for new discourses to be 
injected into Russian politics.
28
 This Westerinzer-deterioration process could be witnessed in 
Kozyrev‘s eventual dismissal (to be replaced by Primakov) and the rise in prominence of those 
advocating a more realist-centered focus on national interests. The decline of Westernizers as an 
identity was connected to perceived failures in their policies. Their policy of disengagement with 
the periphery (Chechnya in particular) led to positions demanding stability and centrality from 
the statists. At the same time NATO expansion eastwards (reinforcing the Otherness of the West) 
tended to suggest statist responses. After all, while Russia was espousing positive-sum games in 
relation to the West, the West was actively taking part in zero-sum games at Russia‘s expense. 
Westernizers became synonymous with ―rolling-on-your-back-ism‖ under this context. At the 
same time the liberal agenda failed domestically (with the 1998 economic collapse) allowing 
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Primakov (and Putin) to come in (and replace the liberal Kozyrev) and to push the balance in 
favor of statists in the domestic arena. In fact it has been argued that Putin was an ideal successor 
simply because he was far removed from the liberal agenda, and this is one reason why Yeltsin 
chose him.
29
 This shift of decreasing liberal influence in top positions of power was marked by 
an accompanying shift in the loss of public support on the part of liberals in general.
30
  
The statists that rose to prominence by the time of the late 1990s shared much in common 
with realists of the Western variety. This discourse was focused on material capabilities, 
balances of power, and national interests. Tsygankov breaks realists into two currents, 
defensive realists (statists) and offensive realists (national communists). While the defensive 
realists seek stability the offensive realists seek restoration (usually based on the Soviet Union as 
a template). Interestingly, the defensive realists (dominant since the end of the 1990s) have 
shared a terminology with some policy makers of the American variety:  
“Politically, this group is neoconservative, both because they generally defend conservative 
principles in the post-Soviet period and because they at times apply this label to themselves. 
While sharing with the aggressive realists an interest in the reintegration of the former 
Soviet territory, defensive realists disagree that such a reintegration should be implemented 
by the use of force. The idea of reestablishing and consolidating Russia's exclusive sphere of 
influence throughout the former Soviet Union without military intervention has supplanted 
the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the former Soviet republics.”31 
 
In this sense statists/defensive realists (such as those found in the Putin administration) 
are separate entirely from offensive realists (equivalent to a party such as the KPRF). While the 
Western media often portrays Putin‘s authoritarianism as a retreat towards a new Soviet Union, 






Table 3: Statist and Neo-Soviet Identities Compared 
 
 Statists (defensive realists) National Communists 
(offensive realists) 
Perceived zone of influence Former Soviet Union Former Soviet Union (ideally 
which will be politically 
restored someday) 
How to establish sphere of 
influence 
Cultural and economic 
partnership 
Political/military dominion 
Basis of Russian identity European state (albeit unique) Eurasian state 
View of polarity in the world Multipolar Bipolar (Russia vs. America) 





Greatest threat/Other from 
within Russia 
Unstable/anarchic periphery 
(which threatens Russian 
stability and power) 
Western elements/liberals 
 
As noted above, defensive realists/statists view states (including Russia) as self-interested 
rather than inherently good or bad. In this sense defensive realists view an anarchic/unstable 
periphery as the greatest threat (in that it threatens Russian power and stability), rather than the 
United States or the West in general.
32
   
The identity of the Putin regime seemed to be situated somewhere in between liberal and 
statist discourses, though one occasionally could see traces of discourses to the right of this 
spectrum. For instance, when Putin stated his intention of "continuing the civilizational role of 
the Russian nation in Eurasia" in 2005, this reflected an identity based on Russia as a ―Eurasian‖ 
country (rather than European, a theme most of his other speeches reinforce).
33
  
Further than even the offensive realists in the KPRF are the Eurasianists, a fringe element 
embodied by parties such as the LDPR. These revolutionists seek not to restore old borders but 
to advocate for a ―conservative revolution‖ both within and beyond Russia‘s historic 
boundaries.
34
 This discourse, popular among a handful of nationalist and fascist groups, has had 





Their Other is both Western elements outside and within Russian society, as well as 
the fascistic currents at times opposing a racial Other (immigrants from the Caucasus and Africa 
for instance) within Russian society.  
 
Of the five groups only two have particular salience in modern Russian politics. 
Westernizers in the style of Kozyrev have been sidelined since the end of the 1990s, and were 
being marginalized even before when Tsygankov detailed the continued marginalization of 
figures such as Kozyrev and Westernizing rhetoric at large.
36
 Offensive realists/national 
communists have been largely absent at the national stage in terms of relevant individuals in 
positions of actual power, though their rhetoric has injected itself into the discursive framework 
at times. One example can be seen when Russia initially cooperated with the United States to 
build bases for the war in Afghanistan in countries such as Kyrgyzstan which are perceived to be 
in Russia‘s sphere of influence. Russia was later rebuffed by President George Walker Bush 
when he refused to remove those bases after the initial war stages were completed, and also 
refused to cooperate with Putin‘s agenda of using force in Chechnya. Many aggressive realists 
pointed to this failing as a major embarrassment for the Putin administration, stemming from his 
misplaced trust in the West and the United States in particular. Despite this, both national 
communists and revolutionists/Eurasianists are marginalized politically, both in terms of the lack 
of success of parties such as the KPRF and the LDPR, and in terms of the instances of rhetoric 
among top policy officials.  
It is for this reason why analysis should be focused on the two dominant discourses 
within Russian politics today. These are the discourses of the more-liberal National Democrats 
and the more-realist Statists. In terms of clan interests, the National Democrats are often 
associated with the professional class or ―civiliki‖ of Medvedev
37
 while the statists are often 
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associated with the ―siloviki‖ of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and its modern 
equivalent, the Federal Security Service (FSB).  
The notion of what the Other entails is dependent on the identity in question. On the one 
hand the periphery of Russia is seen as a threat due to its distance from the center and capacity 
for instability by statists/realists.
38
 On the other hand, the notion of backwardness in the Russian 
periphery and Russia itself, sometimes contributing to the notion of ―legal nihilism‖
39
, is viewed 
as a chief concern among Russian liberals. The shifting foreign policies of Russia coincide with 
the shifting identities employed respectively by Gorbachev‘s New Thinking, to Yeltsin‘s 
integration with the West, to Primakov‘s balancing-of-power, to Putin‘s Great Power 
Pragmatism (the former two being liberal agendas, the latter two being realist in nature). Putin‘s 
statements have been a curious mix of statism and liberalism, in that Putin states that Russia 
―‗was, is and will, of course, be a major European power‘‘ and yet insists that its development 
(of democracy and society at large) must operate on its own unique trajectory separate from 
Europe, with special attention paid to maintaining political stability to avoid any revolutionary 
shifts that could break the system.
40
 In this sense Putin sees the destination of  Russia as 
ultimately the same as Europe, despite crafting a very different journey to reach that destination.  
              Hopf‘s conception of identity is fairly analogous to what has been stated above, with 
―liberal essentialists‖ maintaining an identity of Russia as a unique power that is a mix of 
Western, Soviet, and Eastern aspects and ―New Western Russians‖ seeing Russia principally as a 
Western power that should seek integration with the West. He also includes ―New Soviet 
Russians‖ who looked to the Soviet past (and are analogous to Tsygankov‘s National 
Communists) and an odd categorization of ―liberal relativists‖ that are nihilists that believe there 
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is no true Russia (though this discourse is the most rare in that it seems to be confined to post-
modern intelligentsia articles for the most part).
41
 The important difference to Tsygankov‘s 
categorization is that Hopf‘s ―liberal essentialists‖ are essentially an amalgamation of both 
National Democrats and Statists (and Hopf agrees that this school/these two amalgamated 
schools have been hegemonic since 1999).
42
 For this reason I have chosen to use Tsygankov‘s 
conception (of divorcing statists from national democrats/liberals), in order to better analyze the 
very real differences between factions within the nearly entirely ―liberal essentialist‖ Putin 
administration.  
Foreign Policy And Its Measurement 
 
Interestingly, there are a multitude of ways scholars have defined foreign policy. In fact, 
it has been pointed out that a general theory of foreign policy has yet to emerge, because the 
general idea of exactly what foreign policy is has yet to emerge.
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 To simplify this study I have 
chosen to view foreign policy simply in terms of levels of cooperation between states. Of course, 
―cooperation‖ also must have a specific framework in how it is defined. Cooperation is defined 
in this paper as to how closely Russian elites support Belarusian elites in terms of maintaining 
their monopoly on domestic power. Mutual treaties and statements may reflect rhetorical 
cooperation, but rhetoric and reality are often two separate issues. After all, Putin has been said 
to be exceedingly difficult to read and how he presents Russian foreign policy is largely 
dependent on who his audience is (which is also why I have elected to focus on comprehensive 
Russian policy statements that try to present a unified narrative).
44
  
                 Furthermore, mutual membership in international organizations are especially 
dangerous to use as a tool of cooperation, since both Russia and Belarus have used organization 
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membership as a form of bargaining/coercion (Belarus threatening to join the anti-Russian 
GUAM, Russia threatening to remove Belarus from the Customs Union, etc). Instead I have 
focused on Russian support for Lukashenko (as the paramount leader of Belarus) in Belarusian 
elections. Particularly, contrasting levels of Russian support for Lukashenko in the Belarusian 
presidential elections of 2006 and 2010.  
If this analysis were to simply infer foreign policy preferences from past behavior I 
would leave myself open to the charge of tautology. Instead a ―deduced‖ preference
45
 can be 
used by putting Russian policy towards Belarus on a single continuum ranging from fully 
supporting Lukashenko in his election to fully supporting the opposition (with the noncommittal 
approach applied in the late 1990s acting as a theoretical intermediary position). In the instance 
of full support, articles would discredit foreign attacks on Lukashenko as well as the opposition, 
and paint Lukashenko as the rightful leader of Belarus. In the opposite instance opposition 
candidates would be painted as embodying the will of the people, while Lukashenko would be 
portrayed as an illegitimate autocrat. This concept also reflects a concept of relative versus 
absolute gains. If Lukashenko is seen as an enemy then support for instability in Belarusian 
politics can be justified as being in Russia‘s national interest. On the other hand, if Lukashenko 
is seen as a reliable partner supporting him would be seen as strengthening cooperation with a 
trusted ally.  
The public statements of important figures in Russia will be taken into account regarding 
elections in Belarus, as will reporting done by Russia Today. As a government-owned news 
source, if Russia Today is either outwardly supportive of Lukashenko or his opposition it should 
reflect preferences within the administration, especially if drastic changes in preferences occur in 




Traditional Theories Of Foreign Policy Regarding Russia 
 
The notion that Russian history and foreign-policy in particular is geared towards a 
realist-centered schemata based on materialism and balance-of-power concepts is prevalent in 
academia.
46
 It is for this reason that I have chosen this arch-realist state to test my hypothesis, 
precisely because its realist-history serves as a compelling test for whether ideational factors 
(such as identity) can play a factor in the formation of foreign policy preferences, despite the fact 
that materialist-based analysis is so often applied to Russia.   
While useful, realism tends to only account for changes in foreign policy by looking at 
changes in material capacities. It is less sufficient when explaining change that comes about as 
the result of changes in the conception of what ―national interest‖ fundamentally is. In this way I 
believe realism does not sufficiently explain the Sino-Soviet split, nor can it explain the shifts in 
policy that have come towards a country like Belarus, where Belarusian leadership has remained 
relatively constant since 1994, as well as its strategic benefit as a key periphery state. In order to 
explain shifts in policy toward this friendly country it may help to examine Russian identity.  
Universalist in that liberal theory assumes all states are geared towards a trajectory of an 
inevitable liberalism, liberal theorists could not explain why a Russia striving for modernization 
would have to forge connections with an isolated pariah state such as Belarus.  In such a case 
Russia‘s self-interest would surely lie with the linchpins of globalization rather than a Soviet 
relic (and relations should be relatively stable in their negativity towards that relic). Adherents of 
democratic peace theory would assume the authoritarian nature of Belarus may preclude any 
deep relationship with a Western-leaning Russia in the 1990s. This theory would likely assume 
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that an increasingly authoritarian Russia would either strike a temporary truce, or eventual 
collision course, with Belarus. What this description omits is why this collision would take place, 
or why a partnership would take place. Finally is the liberal notion of transnational ideas crafting 
foreign policy, as the world is not a collection of sovereign automatons so much as an interlinked 
web of societies. While this notion of democracy swaying a reformist Gorbachev may be 
particularly salient, it seems less tenable when viewing a Russia increasingly at odds with the 
external world, first in gas disputes with Ukraine and later with an internationally unpopular war 
in southern Ossetia against Georgian troops.  
The weakness of both outlooks is in their immutability and inability to explain changes in 
preferences. It wasn‘t until authors like Keohane and Nye (1989), Reiter (1996), Lamborn 
(1997), and Farkas (1998) that changes in preferences were explored in detail. While realists 
typically do well in predicting the state-heavy/security-heavy nation of Russia, they do poorly at 
explaining periods of liberal shifts under Gorbachev or Yeltsin when national interests based on 
power are exchanged for subservience to the West. Similarly, while liberals may appear correct 
whenever they are predicting a historically-inevitable drift towards liberal modernization 
(essentially monopolized in its form by the West at that) they have a difficult time explaining 
setbacks to that narrative such as Putin‘s creeping authoritarianism and focus on great-power-
status which sometimes comes at the expense of international cooperation. While they may 
blame this retreat on an underdeveloped civil society or on shadowy factions in Russian 
government, this does little to explain divergences from a liberal path as anything but historical 
anomalies, which hardly makes sense in terms of a historiography for a country that is often 
described as having a richly illiberal past.  
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         Constructivism offers a path around these traditional theories however. It is logical that a 
state experiencing a failure (such as the case of the collapse of the Soviet Union) would look to 
learn successful strategies from abroad, and at the time no society was more successful than the 
old nemesis of Russia and victor of the Cold War, the United States. Under such circumstances it 
might be easy to see the promise of integration with the West and adopting of a liberal 
outlook/foreign policy. This process was articulated in Goldsmith‘s work Imitation in 
International Relations. Constructivism can aid in not only addressing the policy shifts away 
from (or towards) zero-sum/positive-sum mentalities, but it can also help to explain why these 
turns occurred when they did. While Wendt famously stated the ―anarchy is what states make of 
it‖ he never gave an explanation as to why states differ in what they make of it. Several authors 
have accounted for how states generate their preferences (Moravcsik and his subnational actors, 
Jervis and his institutions, Hemmer and his analogies, Goldsmith and his learning). For this 
analysis I seek to use the construction of national identities to illuminate additional explanations 
as to why Russia might have drifted away from Belarus between 2006 and 2010. This is valuable 
in that it sees national interest as something that is not immutable but as something that is 
malleable, and which is dependent on social constructs. It is not only based on a relation between 
the Self and the Other but also the synthesis of all the dynamics within a country: the relations 
between varying social groups, the nature of power within a society, the notions of legitimacy 
inherent in that culture, etc. If we were to look only at identity relations with outsider powers, 
then we would omit half the picture. It is for this reason why domestic interest groups and the 
nature of domestic politics must be taken into account when analyzing identity as it relates to 
foreign policy. After all, a nation is often anything but homogenous in terms of its social identity. 
This is certainly the case with Russia, as several identities have competed with one another, often 
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in tandem with competition amongst domestic interest groups. Looking at the domestic structure 
of Russia is helpful because it reflects that ―the influence of national identity on policy outcomes 
is mediated by an important intervening variable: domestic structures and coalition-building 
processes.‖47
   
This focus on identity as it relates to Russia‘s clan/factional/elite-dominated politics 
assists us in doing two things. The first is to flesh out the relationship between identity and 
foreign policy decisions, so as to check whether the correlation is actually causal. If liberal 
identity is used as a rhetorical device by illiberal personnel it could certainly cast doubt as to if 
the connection is spurious or not. Secondly, it not only illustrates if identity may matter but can 
elaborate as to how it matters by focusing on how it is transmitted on the elite level. Thus the 
model I have adopted is: 
National identity (independent variable)  Domestic structures (intervening variable)  
Foreign policy preferences (dependent variable) 
             A scholar such as Folker may bring up the point that since this constructivist analysis 
relies on institutions/the Russian domestic structure it essentially becomes a liberal analysis with 
constructivist window-dressing in that it replicates the same predictions.
48
 While this is true to an 
extent, the key difference is in explaining the why of the predictions in addition to the what. That 
a liberal clique is more likely to embrace the West is not a shock. What is more revealing is the 
reason why a liberal clique might turn away from a trusted ally in Belarus, or why a leader widely 
described as authoritarian (Putin) might also turn away from a trusted authoritarian ally in 







Brief Notes On Organizational Learning And Its Significance  
 
Goldsmith (2005) outlined three characteristics of organizational learning by stating: 
1. Organizations are goal-based 
2. Behavior is shaped by routine, designed around achieving these goals 
3. Goals/routines are based on information gained from experience (in particular prior successes 
and failures)  
Levitt and March (1996) and Larson (1994) and Glietman (1991) have underscored, 
along with Goldsmith, the notion that schema are more difficult to modify and abandon when 
they are adopted by a group (because organizations need a unified narrative to unite the disparate 
individuals within them). This notion was also reflected in Hopf‘s habituation, or the concept 
that norms aren‘t adhered to so much as they are ingrained via habit.
49
 This also accounts for a 
certain degree of ―organizational inertia‖ (to quote Goldsmith) slowing when policies and 
preferences can actually change.  An example of organizational inertia in Russian politics would 
be officers in the Russian army resisting reforms, even though it was mandated from above and 
they ultimately know it would be in the interest of the state to reform the military and curb 
corruption.
50
 This inertia is worsened by the fact that information that conflicts with the 
dominant schema is likely to be ignored in favor of information that reinforces the 
schema/worldview of the policy maker. This puts overwhelming emphasis on who the policy 
makers are and specifically what schemas are dominant among them. It is for this reason that not 
only discursive formations must be analyzed with regards to identity, but specifically what elite 
groups dominate standard-operation procedure and who monopolizes the dominant schemata at 
the elite level. It is for this reason why an analysis of interest groups and factions within Russian 
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politics is crucial. It is all the more crucial when one realizes that, rather than political party 
hegemony as one might expect in a Western European country, invisible networks of factions 
and clans are what dominate the Russian political landscape. Understanding the factions in 
Russian politics is necessary in order to understand the identity formations that guide Russian 
foreign policy.  
 
What Prompts Identity?: Individual Elites Or Broad Cultural Constructs? Can The Two 
Even Be Divorced? 
 
“Liberal theory is analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the 
conditions under which their assumptions hold.” – Moravcsik
51 
 
              The above quote reflects that domestic matters are what shape the premises normally 
accepted as natural. A domestic structure of a slave society two-thousand years ago may not 
carry the same systemic conditions one would see in a liberal democracy today. Likewise, the 
domestic structure of Russian society matters theoretically as to how identity should be 
operationalized. I argue that in a society where infrastructural power is relatively muted, 
bureaucratic cliques determine access to everything from markets to political access, and where 
foreign policy largely does not depend on public approval, it makes little sense to gauge identity 
from below. While it helps to turn to historical inquiry as a frame of reference in terms of 
categorizations of identity, Russian society‘s ―power vertical‖ also necessitates paying closer 
attention to the groups which make up the elite and how they relate to Russian identities. The 
notion of groups vying to seize control of the state in order to enact their preferences/identities is 
not new in liberal theory
52
, and I have adopted such a logic in order to look at a battle for which 
preferences (and identities!) the state represents at the top level.   
               One issue that must be factored in when it comes to elite groups is the level to which 
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they are a representation of society as a whole. After all, ―the theory determines the method.‖
53
 If 
we believe identity comes from below, our methodology should reflect that thought. If one is to 
side with Hopf in that elites (as reflections of the masses) mirror the ideological demands of the 
masses then we must, likewise, ensure that elites also reflect the ideological heterogeneity of the 
masses as well. If the elites of Russia consciously reflect only some currents (imperialism) while 
actively excluding others (liberalism) then the interest groups and their identities could certainly 
not be representative of Russian identities as a whole.  
If we are to look at electoral results of communist and fascistic parties it is clear that 
these currents are under-represented (essentially absent) at the elite level. Indeed, the very fact 
that they require Potemkin parties (in the form of KPRF on the left and LDPR on the right) is an 
indication that the elite must mirror (in a charade) what a portion of the public feels in reality. 
Hopf would see this gap as a sign that the identities which are missing (for instance, Eurasianism 
and Soviet restorationism) at the elite level are simply discursive formations that are being 
actively repressed and omitted from the national dialogue. In fact, the very act of sanctioning a 
Potemkin party could be seen to be an admission of threat coming from the discourse symbolized 
by that party (particularly that it has a mass-level constituency that must be tamed). Even Hopf 
concedes that leaders may select ―available‖ identities, with the caveat that it is society at large 
that generates what is available in the first place.
54
 This caveat is important, in that Soviet elites 
did not choose to construct an enemy out of the United States because it serves their interests but 
rather because they were shaped by the identities that were available to them, and these identities 
presuppose that enemy status. Despite the fact that elites are products of their world in addition 
to agents working to shape it, there should be little argument that in the case of Russia today 
specifically it is elites that dictate the foreign policy preferences, fundamentally shaped in turn 
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by their identity. An understanding of both identity as it relates to discursive formations and the 
elite structure in Russia that is pushed by that identity is helpful in this regard.  
I have chosen to use framing to analyze Russian identity portrayed by Russia Today, a 
government-run news source. While this elite-focus may marginalize repressed identity-
discourses (such as Eurasianist and neo-Soviet identities), I am comfortable omitting these 
discourses in that I seek not a totality of Russian identity discourses but rather the trajectory of 
discourse monopolization at the elite level. In short, I am especially interested in which identity 
discourse dominates amongst the Russian elite. This is one reason why I narrowed my focus to 
primarily liberal versus statist phraseology.  
Another reason why I have focused on elite discourse is simply that Russian society is 
exceptionally weak in terms of its infrastructural power. The nature of managed public opinion 
and managed opposition
55
 illustrate the ―verticality of power‖ in Russia, as does Putin‘s 2007 
notion that Russia needs to be managed from the top-down for another two decades. Putin 
elaborated on this concept when he described the need for a ―manual society‖ as opposed to an 
―automatic society.‖
56
 The centrality of this concept was known to Medvedev as well, who took 
a subtle jab at the Putinite system in an article titled ―Forward, Russia!‖ when he stated that 
Russia ―unfortunately combines all the shortcomings of the Soviet system and all the difficulties 
of contemporary life.‖
57
 Even though Medvedev had reform on his agenda (some successful and 
some failing) it has been said that he still made sure that political life ―was kept an elite affair.‖
58
 
Furthermore, the reliance on patronage from above has been cited as a reason that Putin recruited 
siloviki from his history to key government posts, rather than through traditional Western 
avenues of elite recruitment like political parties.
59
 In fact only 8.2% of deputies elected in 1994 
even bothered to register with a political party.
60
 Even every-day activities, such as starting a 
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business, may have been possible in the 1990s but by 2004 were next to impossible due to all 
markets being controlled/monopolized to where administrative structures set up impossibly 
excessive regulations so that any entry-level entrepreneur cannot hope to pass.
61
 This very nature 
of the ―verticality of power‖ in Russia necessitates putting elite discourse under a microscope 
first and foremost. If Hopf is right in that elite discourse is simply a reflection of mass discourse, 
then we can simply assume there is no conflict between the two. If Khrushchev was simply the 
manifestation of a growing desire among the masses for an ideological pluralism, then we can 
assume today‘s leaders are similar mirrors of currents from below.  
               This also broaches the subject of the classic agency-structure question in sociology. 
Though my focus on the elite and (in particular) Russia‘s verticality of power necessarily lends a 
heavy analytical emphasis on agency, structure nevertheless plays a role as well. This is 
especially true in that formative events (for example, the economic and diplomatic collapse of 
liberalism in the late 1990s) played an important role in shaping the political landscape of 
Russia. In this sense a ―structure versus agency‖ mentality communicates an unnecessary duality, 
and obscures a fundamentally dialectical relationship, wherein agents mold their structure and 
structure shapes agents. 
Importantly, my theory (that the verticality of power in Russia presupposes that special 
attention be paid to elites-as-identity-and-power-managers) should be reflected in my 
methodology. This is why I have chosen to arrive at identity specifically through elite-
focused framing, and why I pay special attention to discursive formations employed by 
government-owned RT (the elite in other words) over time. In order to expound on the 
concept of the verticality of power in Russia, a closer look must be applied to Russia‘s domestic 
politics.   
31 
 
III. RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC STRUCTURE 
The Clan: The Political Unit Of Russian Politics 
 
 Geert Hofstede, whose research on culture is a staple for MBA students and those 
researching international business practices, rated Russia as having one of the highest power 
distances in the world. In his terminology ―power distance‖ is a reference to how great of a 
distance is put between those of different rank in society. Whereas a lower score is reflective of a 
more egalitarian culture (Austria being 11, Germany being 35 for instance), a higher score would 
be more reflective of a caste-like hierarchy (India being 77, Mexico being 81).
62
 In practical 
terms, how high a country‘s score is can be used to gauge management strategies; in that lower-
score societies may sit employees and management down and speak one-on-one (as in America 
with a score of 40) whereas a higher score would be reflective of a society where management 
may need to invoke hierarchy more to defend its position. Russia having an extremely high 
power distance score (93) could be surmised to be reflective of more than simple Russian 
business practices, but also reflective of views on/of the Russian societal elite in general. It is no 
surprise that such a society transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a communist movement 
that viewed the masses as having a dangerous ―spontaneity‖ (to quote Lenin) to them if not 
properly educated, to a Communist Party with an entrenched nomenklatura, and finally to a 
democracy with an equally entrenched oligarchy/elite structure. Even within the nomenklatura-
elite of the Soviet period the party was of a hierarchical nature, as the elites have been said to 
have been divided among 14 distinct ranks.
63
  
 After the onset of perestroika allowed a new capitalist economy to take shape (with the 
nomenklatura acting as the beneficiaries of this new capitalism) the nomenklatura began (for the 
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first time) to have legitimate economic superiority rather than just personal-networking (based on 
the clan) superiority that was the norm in the Brezhnev era.
64
 They began to use this economic 
and network-superiority to establish political domination. By the onset of liberal democracy in 
the early 1990s the Russian elite had largely grown out of the earlier nomenklatura. Yeltsin‘s act 
of dissolving the Congress of People‘s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet only further limited 
future elite recruitment.  
Interestingly, it was the party elite (more than the top leadership or the business elite or 
parliamentary members or regional elite) that had the most continuity in terms of personnel when 
the Soviet Union collapsed.
65
 While a single-party system gave way to a multi-party system and 
socialism gave way to capitalism there was nonetheless a good deal of continuity in terms of 
those who controlled the levers of power. The case of a high-power-distance country with an 
entrenched and socially-distant elite would seem to be a recipe for a top-down power structure 
and many Western observers have pinpointed the illiberal facets of Russian rule in the last 
decade on the nature of Russian society itself.  
 But it is not enough to simply dismiss Russia‘s tendency towards virtual democracy as a 
symptom of a deeply ingrained illiberalism of the Russian soul. A greater view can be attained 
when one analyzes Russia‘s domestic situation through the lens of clan politics. This focuses on 
elites (which would make sense for a society with such a high power distance) as actors and 
specifically on intrapersonal connections, which would make sense for the world of Russian 
politics where party affiliation and proper titles often take a backseat to invisible coalitions. 
While political parties have dominated the framework in Western communist countries (like the 
Baltics, Poland, etc.) it has been said that clan relations drive the political framework of CIS 
countries.
66,67
 In these instances even strong parties are painted as a façade for clan relations built 
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around powerful individuals.  The situation is noticeably different from Western countries in that 
while it is certain that Clinton brought individuals from his immediate Arkansas circle with him 
to the White House, and that Bush did the same with Texas bureaucrats he had known for years, 
the process is amplified and crucially different in Russia. While the American system focuses 
mainly on parties as instruments of elite recruitment, in Russian politics parties are more the 
levers of power for existing elites, who are organized along largely clan-lines. Likewise, many 
American politicians receive private jobs over business ventures. The difference, however, is that 
in Washington insiders typically get the plum business positions after their government work 
while in Russia they get it during their government work. In fact, it has been stated that this may 
be why there is a certain fear once Russian politicians leave government. The fear is that they 
will lose their patronage/plum jobs, consequently ―Russian officials have learned to take such 
posts and collect the fringes they bring while they can.‖
68
 This system of rewards/punishments in 
terms of contracts and business based on political compliance has an obvious weakness however. 
It has been said this system only works (economically) in boom economies like Russia, and if the 
state is unable to deliver the energy goods or the economy isn‘t strong the state can‘t make such 
promises. The issue with this form of patronage is that it can often devolve and ultimately lead to 
corruption and nepotism. It was under the logic of battling this tendency that was behind 
numerous personnel shuffles in the Putin administration.
69
  
By 2009 United Russia (UR) had established a virtual monopoly on power compared to 
other parties, with 385 out of 450 Duma seats and 111 out of 166 senators on the Federation 
Council.
70
 The lack of importance of the actual electoral vote percentages is reflective of Russian 
politics and its emphasis on powerful individuals rather than parties. While United Russia was 
seen as the party of power since its very inception in 2001, it was only seen as such due to the 
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patronage of Vladimir Putin rather than because of its electoral success. Likewise, early 
speculation of a split before Medvedev‘s election came to nothing when UR aligned behind 
Medvedev and liberal bureaucrats were retained in a somewhat illiberal party. Political parties in 
Russia thus merely give the illusion of pluralism, as real power is centered on powerful 
individuals and clans which surround them. Electoral successes thus only reflect a very broad 
picture of public perceptions. Even then, after 2000 these electoral snapshots are marred by the 
fact that these votes are cast in a managed democracy where the monopolization of state media is 
centered in the hands of the Kremlin (thus closing avenues for genuine opposition candidates be 
they liberal, communist, or nationalist).   
Putin has maintained his power by leading UR as chairman of the dominant party 
(importantly, he is not a member however, so while he can leverage UR, UR cannot leverage 
him). It is with the premiership of the dominant party and the ―Putinite majority in the Federation 
Council‖ that Putin has maintained the levers of power in Russia. The 9
th
 Congress of the UR 
(April 15, 2008) is when this party-to-individual subordination reportedly occurred.
71
  
It should come as no surprise in such a managed and patronage-heavy society (with a 
high power-distance) that the president and his immediate allies/clan were said to be at the very 
pinnacle of the Russian political hierarchy.
72
   Under these circumstances it is also no surprise 
that in a 2004 poll of Russians, 50% of poll respondents trusted Putin personally whereas only 









Belarus: A Deviation From CIS Clan Formations 
 
Belarus initially shared much in common with other CIS countries. Clan networks were 
at the heart of domestic politics rather than official political parties. There were few changes in 
government, elections were motivated by personal patronage rather than ideology, and there was 
a predominance of single-mandate electoral systems. The difference, however, was while other 
CIS countries exhibited instances of warring clans Lukashenko managed to monopolize power 
around himself. One reason cited for this was in that Lukashenko specifically appealed to the 
masses as a populist in order to prevent elite formation of rival clans. In this CIS context ―clans‖ 
are defined as being the ―result of the adapation of the former communist boss politics to the 
epoch of competitive elections‖ in which powerful individuals control networks of power.
74
 
 It was this populism that initially drove Lukashenko to power, as Chernov put it 
following an ―anti-bourgeois and anti-nomenklatura‖ platform. By 1995 Lukashenko received 
increased powers via a referendum and by 1996 he used the socialist tactic (used by Stalin, 
Khrushchev, and Mao when they depended on populism to attack party functionaries… though 
most scholars focused only on Gorbachev‘s anti-bureaucratic campaigns) of holding a plebiscite 
for increased presidential powers. This strategy was framed by Lukashenko as being necessary in 
order to fight elites within the political framework.
75
 This picture of individual consolidation in 
Belarus is contrasted with the clan wars in both Russia and Ukraine during the same time period. 
While Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine‘s president) had appointed men to facilitate regional loyalty to 
the center, Lukashenko actually shuffled leaders around at the regional level so no power base 
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could consolidate itself to begin with. Indeed, the defendants in the 1996 show trials in Belarus 
were not liberal opposition activists, but rather elites and businessmen.
76
  
This monopolization of political power and the clan system is why Belarus serves as an 
ideal control variable for identity shifts in Russia being brought about due to primary identity 
shifts in Belarus. While Ukraine has shifting clan formations, shifting party monopolization, and 
shifting identities at the top echelon of power, the Lukashenko regime is a remarkably stable 
authoritarian system that has neutralized these varying conditions. Lukashenko‘s monopolization 
of domestic power goes hand-in-hand with the stability of his neo-Soviet foreign policy. In this 
sense, if there is a sudden shift in identity relations it can more than likely be attributed to the 
Russian side, rather than caused by a change in either side as one would have to account for if 
Ukrainian-Russian or American-Russian relations were analyzed. 
 
The Siloviki In Power And The Connection Between Factions And Identities 
 
The notion of domestic groups aligning with specific identities and foreign policies is 
common in scholarship on Russian politics. Tsygankov
77
 listed the constituencies of the liberal 
identity groups of Westernizers and National Democrats as including human rights activists, pro-
capitalist businessmen, the intelligentsia, and liberal leadership from the Yeltsin era. 
Interestingly coinciding with his classification of the intelligentsia as liberals, the intelligentsia 
were also described as being the most likely to agree that the KGB should be abolished outright, 
a position only held by 10% of Soviet citizens in 1990.
78
 Tsygankov lists the constituency of the 
statist agenda as the army, military industrialists, and the security services (the siloviki: a term 
which translates as ―people of force‖ that would include the KGB, the FSB and the Federal 
Narcotics Control Service); those who naturally value strength and stability on the state-level 
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above all else. I would venture to modify Tsygankov‘s model and add ―neo-corporatist 
businessmen‖ to the category of statists, lest they fall into the category of liberals due to their 
background in business. Bremmer and Charap cited the siloviki as statists and economic 
nationalists who sought to restore Russia to a great power status on the world stage, and that the 
siloviki promoted Russia balancing against other world powers.
79
 Olga Kryshtanovskaya 
described the siloviki worldview as follows: 
“That state is the basis of society; therefore the state should be strong. A strong state controls 
everything. The supports of the state are the siloviki and law enforcement agencies in general. 
[…] They need a special status-material and legal. […] A strong state should also control the 
economy, at least its natural resources, which cannot be allowed to remain in private hands. 
[…] There is still an external enemy-the West-and this means that a strong army is needed, and 
a powerful armament industry. […] Society should be passive and obedient, and not impede the 
strengthening of the state.”80  
 
Dawisha outlined a general foreign policy outlook for the siloviki when she stated: 
“For the siloviki, Russia‟s connections with Venezuela‟s Chavez, Syria‟s Assad, Iran‟s 
Ahmadinejad, Libya‟s Gadhafi, and, of course, Central Asian leaders and Belarus‟s 
Lukashenka, plus, they hope, Ukraine‟s Yanukovych, are key to recreating a worldwide 
network of authoritarian leaders who support each other not only in military/intelligence 
advice, but also in offshore banking, money laundering, and other illicit activities.”81 
 
                  This statist-identity and its representation through a security-based foreign policy may 
not only be strong but exceedingly difficult to change among some Russian elites. Larson 
catalogued instances
82
 of foreign policy establishment officials in Reagan‘s administration being 
more difficult to sway than Reagan himself (who was a foreign policy novice) as to the changed 
nature of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. While Reagan believed Gorbachev based on 
repeated instances of Gorbachev caving to American demands, some in his administration (who 
had more deeply internalized the schema that the Soviet Union would always be hostile) found it 
more difficult to accept. This same process could be at work among the siloviki, who had a 
lifetime of experience working for the KGB and operating under Cold-War mentalities that the 
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United States and Russia are locked in a zero-sum realist struggle for power (especially when 
this schema was confirmed in 2002 when American policies were directed against Russian 
interests despite Russian cooperation in the War on Terror). This is especially true if we take into 
account Johnston‘s assertion that persuasion to change is less likely when the persuader 
originates from a separate identity group.
83
 This would entail siloviki reinforcing their statist 
worldview through habit/socialization amongst themselves, and not being easily swayed by 
outside sources. 
While it may be doubtful whether the siloviki were able to create a ―militocracy‖ (to 
borrow a term from Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2003), they did exert increasing influence as the 
Putin administration wore on. By 2003, the amount of siloviki had more than doubled in terms of 
percentages when compared with the amount of siloviki personnel employed by Yeltsin in 1993. 
In 2003 the siloviki made up to 58.3% of the personnel in terms of national leadership positions. 




The siloviki were instrumental in definitive policy changes. The March 27, 2007 report 
"A Review of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy" is a Kremlin document that spoke of 
"great power pragmatism."
85
 It reflected a change from the previous 2000 foreign policy concept, 
the chief of which was a stronger emphasis on multipolarity. This time period also coincided 
with the new Russian assertiveness voiced by Putin when, in Munich, he famously spoke out in 
favor of a zero-sum-style multipolarity as being key to Russian foreign policy.
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 It has been 







Cracks In The Illusion Of Elite Unity 
 
                 The heyday of siloviki power came to an abrupt end in 2007 and underscored the 
nature of Putin not as siloviki godfather, nor liberal Judas, but as a faction manager balancing 
rival clans against one another… and at times losing control. In fact, Putin has been highlighted 
multiple times not as a dictator who has a country dance to his tune, but rather as a political 
mediator between rival political clans.
88
 In fact, while Putin is often painted as an autocrat in the 
Western media, it has been put forward that he remained in Russian politics simply because he 
had to in order to make sure the system did not fall apart without him as a mediator.
89
 There has 
been evidence that Putin, after all, had intended to leave the political scene had the system not 
required him to stay on.
90
 That Putin could not stay on for a third successive term in 2008 has 
been seen as a defeat for the siloviki.
91
  
 In this sense Putin is not merely Prime Minister (PM) officially but also faction manager 
unofficially. He is given this role
92
 because Medvedev has no base of power from which to 
operate, unlike Putin. Interestingly, Putin himself has stated that he stayed on as PM ―because I 
know what my friends the siloviki are planning for the country if I leave completely.‖
93
 
Likewise, the Medvedev regime has been viewed as a middle-ground between contending 
currents of liberal openness and siloviki isolationism.
94
  
 The notion of clans independent of the president is a common one. In regards to foreign 
policy specifically, it has been said that stability is the key to maintaining domestic power and 
that it is instabilities (such as an Iranian war creating a flood of refugees, NATO expansion or the 
ABM creating instabilities in security outlooks, etc.) that ―may provide ammunition to those 
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inside Russia's political class who resent Russia's great-power pragmatism and want to push an 
assertive style toward radically different anti-Western politics.‖
95
 In other words this ―political 
class‖ (implied to be separate from the president) might be susceptible to identity-shifts, in that 
while the ―great-power‖ pragmatists may currently be in control (analogous to statists/siloviki) 
there are more explicitly anti-Western currents bubbling beneath the surface. It is noteworthy 
that the ―political class‖ here is illustrated as the engine of policy and change. 
The clan around Igor Sechin, one of the most powerful of the siloviki (described as their 
leader by Dawisha),
96
 in particular has been described as being responsible for the death of 
Rodina (a government-sponsored opposition party). The siloviki was also credited with moves to 
create Just Russia; a center-left opposition party that replaced Rodina as the favored opposition 
party, retaining the economic nationalism/protectionism valued by the siloviki but not the 
cultural nationalism that Rodina was characterized by that was supported by many of the 
siloviki.
97
 Just Russia tapped into the protest vote by attacking clan politics and bureaucratism on 
the local level (while also avoiding criticism on the federal, and especially presidential, levels of 
course) and as portraying itself as a party of the working man disconnected from the elite 
interests that actually powered Just Russia behind the scenes.
98
 There have even been 
suggestions that Medvedev may have been overseeing Just Russia in mid-2008 when Just Russia 




Further changes unfolded in 2007 when two siloviki clans brought their war to the public. 
In October of 2007 a fissure erupted in the world of Russian politics. While the realm of the 
clans of Russia is a murky one at best, with shifting alliances and ebbs and flows that are often 
not reflected at all by official titles, occasionally what happens behind the scenes will spill into 
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the public view. This happened when Viktor Cherkesov, the head of a major siloviki clan and a 
major Putin ally, published an open letter in Kommersant that was critical of the FSB (led by 
Nikolai Patrushev) and warned that a war between clans could collapse the Putinite system itself. 
Cherkesov was the head of the Federal Drug Control Service of Russia (FSKN), which had 
expanded to become a rival in power to the FSB itself. Despite the narrow-focus of its title the 
FSKN had power over fighting organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as being essentially 
the tax police of Russia and more. Cherkesov was in open conflict with FSB head Patrushev and 
his Kremlin allies led by Sechin (another major Putin ally). In the article Cherkesov warned that 
the clan fighting would result in the destruction of both clans, similar to how warring clans in the 
late Yeltsin era led to an implosion of the tenuous alliance of oligarchs that ran Russia at the 
time. The fact Cherkesov was attacking Sechin in the Russian media showed that Putin had 
already lost control to a certain extent in his role as faction manager.  
The 2007 clan war was not the only instance of Putin‘s lack of control as faction-
manager. In March of 2005 Alexei Miller (the CEO of Gazprom) appeared with Sergei 
Bogdanchikov (the CEO of Rosneft). Just a day after Gazprom said it was merging with Rosneft 
the CEO of Rosneft publicly denied it was true, which was followed by the Gazprom press office 
calling their statement ―a technical mistake.‖ The Kremlin then issued a statement saying that 
Rosneft had retracted its statement, while Rosneft stated that it never made the statement in the 
first place. This comical process, for all its twists and turns, shows that bureaucratic fighting 
behind the scenes occasionally spills out in public.
100
 This temporary lapse of control reflects a 
lack of control on Putin‘s part over the various factions. Interestingly, in the end Rosneft did in 
fact remain separate from Gazprom. While Rosneft‘s public divergence from the Kremlin was as 
egregious as anything Yukos showed, the difference was that Rosneft is closely aligned with the 
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siloviki. Rosneft‘s chairman is Sechin and its vice chairman is Sergei Naryshkin. Both of these 
individuals are ex-KGB men from Saint Petersburg. Interestingly, Sechin has been reassigned to 
being deputy Prime Minister (seen as a demotion) by Medvedev in 2008, while Naryshkin has 
become Medvedev‘s chief of staff. Likewise, Cherkesov was demoted in 2008 by Medvedev as 
well, when he was sacked as Head of the State Committee for the Control of the Circulation of 
Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances. 
Also in 2007 a siloviki by the name of Vladimir Kumarin was arrested (presumably by 
the rival Sechin clan). Whether it was Kumarin against Sechin or Sechin against Cherkesov, the 
nature of intra-siloviki warfare cannot be dismissed. This was summarized nicely by Goldman 
when he stated: 
 
“Undoubtedly some of this jockeying for control reflected a deep concern that Putin‟s 
successor would relocate some of the country‟s assets and strip the new siloviki oligarchs of 
their assets just as Putin stripped the original oligarchs.”101 
 
The popular notion was that if someone as politically well-equipped as Putin couldn‘t 
stop the feuding it was doubtful that Medvedev would be able to do so. This is cited as one 
reason why Putin never leaves the political scene-- the concept that without him the faction-wars 
would get out of hand. In this sense one can view the fact that Medvedev held Putin on as a 
Prime Minister to be as much a ploy to protect himself from the siloviki as it is a method for 
Putin to retain power in some form.
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The pivotal moment in the ocean of shifting Russian clan politics was the open war 
between Sechin and Cherkesov. Putin wasted no time in cleaning up the aftermath of that 
specific outburst, and then proceeded to downgrade the power of the siloviki in general:  
“The system of attaching security officials from the MVD, FSB and the defence ministry to the 
presidential administration and the government, which had been in full flood between 2001 and 





This decree at the beginning of 2008 was preceded by the declaration of Medvedev as 
Putin‘s preferred successor (December 10, 2007) and his endorsement by the four major pro-
Kremlin parties (United Russia, Fair Russia, Agrarian Party of Russia, and Civilian Power) 
occurred on December 17, 2007. The demotions of both Sechin and Cherkesov (two of the most 
powerful siloviki) at the hands of Medvedev along with Putin‘s approval of Medvedev as his 
successor (instead of Viktor Zubkov or Sergei Ivanov, both siloviki that many observers assumed 
could be nominated as successor to Putin), would indicate an ebb in the power of the siloviki, to 
be replaced by the more liberal ―civiliki‖ of Medvedev (and ultimately, liberals patronized by 
Putin). Medvedev‘s rise coincided with the demotion of four siloviki in the Sechin clan and 
many in Cherkesov‘s St. Petersburg-based siloviki clan.  
 
The Transferring Of Power From The Siloviki To The Civiliki 
 
“Associated with Mededev, but clearly also enjoying the support of Putin, are economic neo-
liberals like Anatoly Chubais and Aleksey Kudrin, who advocate for a „liberal empire‟ in which 
Russia uses its overweening economic position vis-à-vis the so-called „near abroad‟ to gain 
economic and therefore political leverage.” – Dawisha
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From 2007 to 2010 a shuffling of elites seemed to indicate a transfer of power from the 
siloviki towards the civiliki. This shift is important in that it reinforces causality between 
identity and foreign policy preferences. If illiberal officials employ liberal rhetoric/identities 
the correlation may be spurious in that there is a shift towards liberal identity but away from 
liberal individuals. The table below is a categorization of major politicians by their faction. The 
names and categorizations were given in 2005 by Kryshtanovskaya and White.
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 I have since 




Table 4: The Changing Fortunes of the Elite 
 
Position of power Siloviki Liberals 
Presidential administration Sechin, Viktor Ivanov Medvedev, Surkov, 
Illarionov* 




Gref, Kudrin*, Zubarov, 
Trutnev, Gordeev, Reiman, 
Naryshkin 




Other institutions Ustinov, Stepashin, Primakov*  
Party leaders Gudkov Gryzlov, Rogozin 
 
* Unchanged names are those that I could not retrieve information on (or could not verify if their current position 
has been a promotion, demotion, or simply a plum job to ease them into a consensual retirement) 
* Italicized names are those that have been demoted, almost all of which in 2008 (the exception being Gennady 
Gudkov, whose party in 2007 was merged with Just Russia, where he no longer maintains any meaningful 
leadership position).  
* Underlined names are those that have been promoted, all of which in 2008 
* Bolded names are those who have maintained their position from 2005 onwards 
* Bolded and underlined names have transferred to positions of economic power and away from politics 
* Bolded and italicized names have transferred from one political position to another without a discernable increase 
or decrease in power 
* The asterisks denote special cases that could not be categorized. On the siloviki side, Pyotr Latyshev has died of a 
heart failure, and Primakov has resigned from active politics due to old age. On the liberal side, Andrei Illarionov in 
late 2005 defected from government to join the opposition against Putin. Alexei Kudrin maintained his power up 
until 2011, when he publicly stated that he would refuse to serve under Putin if Putin was running for president 
again in 2012 and would prefer to serve under Medvedev only, after which Medvedev asked him to resign.  
 
                The important point to note is the only post-Medvedev promotion among the siloviki is 
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Viktor Ivanov (who replaced the disgraced Cherkesov as head of the powerful Federal Drug 
Control Service of Russia). The only post-Medvedev demotion among the liberals was Kudrin‘s 
exceptional case just recently. It certainly appears that since 2008 the power of the liberal faction 
has grown relative to the siloviki. While this analysis of a handful of names and their fortunes 
since 2005 is not conclusive as a gauge in the decline and rise of factions, it does provide a 
valuable insight into the non-transparent world of factions, by comparing the relative fortunes of 
individuals and factions. This supports the notions advanced by other sources of a power transfer 
from the siloviki to the liberals surrounding Medvedev.
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 This methodology of classification-by-faction is not uncontested however. I disagreed 
with Kryshtanovskaya‘s notion of categorizing Stepashin as being subsumed under a monolithic 
siloviki/statist ideology (or Surkov as a liberal!). It seems the reasoning behind categorizing 
Stepashin as one of the siloviki is merely his occupational background as being a Colonel-
General in the army. It ignores the fact that he investigated the KGB as a potential coup plotter 
against Gorbachev, and also that he ran for office under the liberal party Yabloko in 1999. While 
there seems to be some correlation between occupational background and political worldviews, it 
certainly isn‘t a perfect predictor and one cannot assume a military rank can be equated with 
either an affiliation with the KGB or an embracing of force structure/statist ideology in general. 
This fact is certainly reflected in the liberal-leaning Colonel-General Stepashin.  
 
Medvedev: Not Quite A Puppet After All 
 
 Sakwa defined the onset of the Medvedev era as a restoration ―with a more stable liberal-
statist configuration‖ after the balance of factions was upset during the Yukos scandals. 
Interestingly, he states it is pointless to wonder who the dominant partner in the Medvedev-Putin 
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duumvirate is since ―the constitutional position was clear, while political practice would be a 
matter of experimentation, there was little reason to believe that the relationship in normal 
circumstances would not work well.‖ Even when it was tested in the Georgian war the division 
was still clear. For example, Medvedev negotiated with Sarkozy (who was representing the EU) 




 One of Medvedev‘s chief concerns has been his call to overcome ―legal nihilism‖, and 
this has essentially been viewed as a jab at the siloviki structures, worded in a way to reflect his 
legal/St. Petersburg background.
108
 His massive reshuffling of personnel came mostly at the 
expense of the increasingly weakened siloviki
109
 as Medvedev infused his own ―civiliki‖ into 
positions of power. Sakwa outlined this process by stating ―Medvedev planned a mass rotation of 
regional heads to implant businessmen under 55 years of age who could break up clan 
loyalties.‖
110
 Medvedev‘s policy was also separate from Putin‘s, as he took the lead on multiple 
reform initiatives in the party system, fighting ―legal nihilism‖ by combatting both corruption 
and the prevalent bureaucratism that spawned it, and modernizing the economy.
111
 Not only were 
attempts made, but Medvedev realized some accomplishments in terms of reforming the 
domestic system in various ways. Under Medvedev there was a greater emphasis on property 
rights, the rule of law, seeking consensus in international politics (but not at the expense of 
Russia‘s perceived interests), and greater pluralism in the public sphere.
112
 In his ―Forward, 
Russia!‖ article Medvedev even attacked elements of the Putinite system (though he didn‘t 
criticize Putin as an individual). The issue with this, however, has been Medvedev‘s inability to 
reform a system from above without a real constituency for political change (among elites) and 





 Some have even argued
114
 that threatening opposition from the regime comes not 
from the United Opposition, a hodge-podge of elite-groups consisting of everything from liberals 
to fascists whose effectiveness is nearly nonexistent because they only stand for overthrowing 
the regime, but rather that true opposition comes from below. This reinforces the notion of even 
Medvedev fearing a genuine revolution-from-below while paradoxically at the same time 
wanting to increase the power of Russian civil society. In particular this ―from below‖ opposition 
includes militant trade unions, exacerbated by the fact that in 2005 many social safety nets were 
abolished with the rationalization that these features were no longer necessary in a relatively 
stabilized economy.  
 
Dual Power In Russia From 2008 Onwards 
 
Much has been written about the nature of dual power (dvoevlastie) during the Russian 
revolutions of 1917. In that historical instance it was a case of the monarchy being replaced by 
two separate sources of competing power: the liberal/bourgeois provisional government and the 
socialist/proletarian Soviets led by the Bolsheviks. This dualistic framework held the tenuous 
Russian state together from the liberal revolution in February until it was undone by the 
Bolshevik revolution in October (or more appropriately November, if one is to use the Gregorian 
calendar).  
Importantly, a new form of dual power has arisen in modern-day Russia. While the 
circumstances are different from 1917, in obvious ways they share certain similarities, 
particularly in that both periods illustrate an effort to fill a power vacuum. Sakwa labeled what 
formed under the Medvedev presidency a ―tandemocracy.‖
115
 Under this arrangement the 
position (as given by Russian law) of the president (Medvedev) focuses on security and foreign 
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policy concerns whereas the position of Prime Minister (Putin) focuses on economic and social 
concerns.  
 
                  Another form of dual power was (in the words of Sakwa) between the ―prerogative 
state‖ (clan/non-law-based) and the ―constitutional state‖ (law-based). These two elements 
merged in the first decade of the twenty-first century since the Putin administration derived much 
of its legitimacy from the constitution/democracy. The democratic source of legitimacy was 
viewed as important for the regime, as Putin‘s approval ratings rarely dipped below 70 percent. 
Sakwa even reflected a notion that Putin‘s course was synonymous with Russian desires at large: 
“Putin reflected the policy preferences of the population, with just under half supporting the 
continuation of reforms but with a stronger state role and ensuring popular welfare, while only 
10 percent called for the continuation of reforms with a decreased role for the state, while 
another 11 percent supported the swift and decisive implementation of reform. Only 22 percent 
favored a return to the Soviet system.”116  
 
The same mass-level focus (as a legitimization tool) can be seen in terms of Putin‘s 
foreign policy agenda as well. A 2008 poll reflected the view that Ukraine joining NATO was a 
threat to Russian national security (74%) and that Georgia doing the same was also a threat 
(77%).
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 By early 2009 (after the Georgian war) the views of the average Russian towards 
NATO were even worse, with only 8% of those polled viewing the organization positively.
118
  In 
fact, in March of 2007, incidentally at the height of Russian assertiveness and talk of 
multipolarity, a poll reflected a wide consensus on foreign policy: 61% stated that the Kremlin‘s 
policy was ―well considered and well balanced‖ while 16% thought it was too pro-Western and 
only 8% said it was too uncompromising with the West (perhaps the same 8% of liberals who 
held a positive view of NATO in later polls).
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Of course, there were instances of when the prerogative state won out as well: one 
example being the Yukos dismemberment.
120
 Similarly, Putin was not just a constituency-
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appeaser to the Russian public for the sake of retaining a high approval rating. Both his post-9/11 
alliance with America and his monetization of social benefits in 2005 faced little public support.  
While Putin‘s focus on civil peace ameliorated much of the conflictual politics of the 
1990s, it did introduce a technocratic ―court system‖ type of rule where vying interests/factions 
within an administration constantly struggle for power. This conflict between prerogative and 
constitutional states was highlighted when strengthening the rule of law was said to be 
Medvedev‘s top priority.  Meanwhile, Putin‘s managerialism has been compared to Singapore‘s 
―trustee democracy‖,
121
 and his style of government has reflected that top-down management. He 
displayed this management style economically when he made efforts to ensure that business ran 
business (not politics as in the 1990s) and when he supported the idea of ―national champions‖ in 
energy, manufacturing, etc. He displayed this management style politically in the form of a 
political managerialism that exerted a peculiar form of ―political guardianship‖ over democratic 
processes and gave birth to the notion of Putin‘s reign as one of ―sovereign democracy‖ as 
outlined in his 2005 speech to the Federal Assembly.  
 
The Meaning Of The New Centrism In Context 
  
“Different identity coalitions form to promote their visions. Promoted by various identity 
groups in both public and private spaces, identity contestation is especially intense until one of 
the available visions becomes predominant.” […] “Foreign policy then is a highly political 
phenomenon. It evolves with the rise and fall of various identity visions, as advocated by 
different social and political groups.” – Tsygankov
122 
 
That foreign policy shifts have occurred is clear, as is the fact that shifts have occurred 
amongst the dominance of those at the top of the pyramid of Russia‘s power structure. At first 
glance it may be simple to individualize this change as simply the whim of the leader (and 
change coming in the form of leadership changes) under an authoritarian system. In reality 
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however, the process reaches beyond the individual level-- even an individual as dominant as 
Putin has been over the last decade. While Putin may have never retreated from the scene, his 
dynamic role as faction manager may reveal when factions are in the ascent or descent from a 
position of dominance. In fact, rather than managing factions Putin could just as accurately be 
described as a gauge of factions. In this sense Putin is not merely the agent but also the subject, 
not only shaping the dominance of certain factions but also being shaped by them. Putin‘s 
endorsement of the siloviki in his first term and then clear acts to disenfranchise elements of the 
siloviki just before the end of his second term in order to facilitate a transition to Medvedev 
shows either a sense of factional schizophrenia on the part of Putin or a confirmation of the fact 
that Putin, indeed, is not an autocrat but rather a cog in a machine (despite being the single most 
important individual cog).   
The factional and systemic stalemate of the Medvedev era (and the foreign-policy middle 
ground it necessitated) is as much as reflection of the identity stale-mate makeup at the elite level 
(and perhaps mass-level if we are to infer that elites are reflections of the masses as Hopf might 
argue) as it is a case of simply an elite change towards a centrist in the form of Medvedev. In 
fact, some authors have even questioned the intensity/salience of Putin‘s own silovik identity, 
arguing that he did not hold a leading position in the KGB (where his rank was lieutenant-
colonel) and finished his career in a small sub-unit in the GDR. By 1990 Putin was said to be 
more focused on his doctoral dissertation in international law than he was on the KGB, which he 
left the next year. Furthermore, he was only officially appointed as director of the FSB (and 






Similar shifts in identity-group dominance have been catalogued in the past, as Putin‘s 
first-term adoption of a synthesis of statism and liberalism (adopting balance of power tactics, 
while discarding Primakov‘s anti-Westernism) have been portrayed as the result of an 
administration split between liberal and statist factions.
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 The declining aspects of liberalism in 
Putin‘s foreign policy could be witnessed in the increasing preponderance of siloviki personnel 
at roughly the end of Putin‘s first term. Similarly, with the decline of the siloviki at the end of 
Putin‘s second term and the rise of ―civiliki‖ National Democrats/liberals such as Medvedev, we 
could expect a similar rise of foreign policy liberalism under the Medvedev administration. The 
factional stalemate of the Medvedev administration should reflect a tempering of Russia‘s 
previous statist foreign policy objectives with increasingly liberal policies. Stalemates in faction 
domination would lead theoretically to centrism in terms of foreign policy. 
This case was summarized by Sakwa when he referenced a November 5, 2008 speech 
where Medvedev ―wove a careful balance between liberal and silovik positions, reflecting the 
continued stalemate.‖
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 In fact, it was not merely this speech that reflected a synthesis of liberal 
and silovik positions which necessitated a form of centrism-- it also appeared in terms of 
Medvedev‘s foreign policy. Medvedev has been described as ―both hawk and liberal.‖
126
 He has 
swung from talks of deploying nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad (on the day Obama was 
inaugurated as president) in order to counteract the American ballistic-missile-defense, to 
retracting those statements (once Obama sought to discontinue the missile shield and ―reset‖ 
relations) and calling for a non-confrontational foreign policy where ―there is no point us puffing 
up our chests‖ in his 2009 address to the Federal Assembly.
127
 Dual power in contemporary 
Russia appears to be able to describe not only a balance between the prerogative and 
constitutional states, but also between civiliki/liberal and siloviki/statist worldviews.  
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IV. RUSSIAN-BELARUSIAN RELATIONS 
The Trajectory Of Russian Foreign Policy Since The Collapse Of The Soviet Union 
 
                   It is typical that most policy in an established state is the product of ―standard 
operating procedure,‖ rather than individual foreign policy decisions. This reliance on standard 
operating procedure, however, was not the case in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, which had no standard operating procedure all the sudden. It‘s been stated that the 
―division of responsibility between government institutions was unclear and often contentious, 
and channels of communication had yet to be established.‖
128
 While at first the Russian 
constitution was murky as to how foreign policy would be created, it gave the legislative branch 
the right to formulate a general framework for foreign policy and the executive branch 
(particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/MFA) responsibility for implementing it. By 1993 
however the new constitution switched foreign policy almost entirely to the executive, and the 
president especially. By 1995 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs were made directly subordinate to 
the president.  
 
               So while foreign policy was directed by Yeltsin as proscribed by the constitution, the 
uneasy clan politics and shifting power bases of Russia directly conflicted with his (and FM 
Kozyrev‘s) liberal agenda. Aides were sent to make policy statements abroad, sometimes 
conflicting with the MFA or the Security Council. Sometimes the Ministry of Defense made 
statements that conflicted with Yeltsin statements (often made off the cuff and surprising even 
his staff). This schizophrenic foreign policy was based on a schizophrenic/shifting clan base and 
an anarchic ―Byzantine factionalism‖
129
 that was based on ―shifts of power and allegiance among 





It wasn‘t until Primakov became Foreign Minister in 1996 (who then became Prime 
Minister in 1998) that a degree of stability was introduced. The hardening-realist position of 
Primakov sought to counter-balance the United States with a Russian-Chinese-Indian alliance, 
and this position was solidified when Putin became president. Importantly, however, Putin did 
not see the United States as a chief rival at first, unlike Primakov. A new national security 
concept was released in 2000, followed by a new foreign policy concept in June of 2000 which 
promoted a ―new world order.‖
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Both of these documents seemed to ―indicate a significant 
hardening‖ from the Yeltsin era.
132
 It was with Putin that the power of the presidency stabilized, 
the open-conflict with the Duma faded, the warring clans were pacified, and cooperation rose in 
tandem with the power of the MFA. The statist identity in statements arose in that ―pragmatism 
is the recurring theme of the foreign policy statements of Putin and his government‖
133
 in tandem 
with an infusion of siloviki personnel into government positions.
134
 The infusion of siloviki into 
positions such as the Foreign Ministry (like Vyacheslav Trubnikov)
135
 and at both the national 
and regional-levels is well-documented.
136
  
The Putin era‘s theme was one of immediate ―securitization‖
137 
and one where even 
economic means were ultimately used towards security-based ends.
138
 Despite lip-service to 
economic matters while abroad the actual Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 shifted its major focus 
towards issues relating to security.
139
 This focus held throughout Putin‘s first-term as concerns 
mostly focused on terrorism and the US Anti-Ballistic Missile Shield. But while security and 
stability (above all else) was at the core of Putin‘s worldview, in the end Putin‘s worldview was 




“His is not a classical realist, confrontational view of the world, since he accepts 
interdependency and globalization as part of today‟s realities. Nevertheless, his view is 
informed as much by notions of competition as by cooperation”140  
 
Indeed, if we are to use Larson‘s idea that a core belief system (in this case Putin‘s desire 
for law and order) may be surrounded by ―organized but atomized schemas about politics‖ it is 
easier to see how Putin‘s policy has been centered on security and yet departs from its premises 
in key areas (especially in context of cooperation with Western Europe). This is why an 
individual like Putin, who may have complexities within himself, in addition to balancing 
factional complexities in the real world, may carry with him schemas that are ―therefore more 
comprehensive; they include belief systems as well as isolated knowledge structures.‖
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Shifts occurred with a new foreign policy again in 2008 after the election of Medvedev. 
This foreign policy introduced a new priority in that, whereas in 2000 five priorities were listed 
for foreign policy, in 2008 there was now a sixth priority listed: ―the primacy of law in 
international relations.‖
142
 This priority was listed in second place, just after a ―new world 
order.‖ The majority of the focus here (and elsewhere) was centered on multilateral cooperation 
under the aegis of the UN on one hand, and using this cooperation to promote a multipolar world 
on the other hand.  
 
A History Of The Russia-Belarus Relationship 
 
 Belarus and Russia have maintained a close political bond since their independence from 
the Soviet Union. While a more thorough look at Russian-Belarusian relations is available (see 
appendix A), here I have elected to focus specifically on relations from the start of the first Putin 
administration (2000) until the end of 2010. The first Belarusian elections to be held in the Putin-
era occurred in September of 2001. This election, which Europeans regarded as ―unfair and 
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fraudulent,‖ was supported by Putin when, after the election, he personally called to congratulate 
Lukashenko on his ―convincing victory.‖
143
 Unlike previous Belarusian elections in the pre-Putin 
era, in 2001 Lukashenko was bolstered by visits from Kremlin officials while Russian media 
covered him favorably on a consistent basis.
144
  
 This did not mean that Belarus was immune to conflict with Russia, however. Putin‘s 
first term marked significant diplomatic overtures towards America in addition to conflicts with 
Belarus. In August of 2002 Putin suggested that Belarus join Russia in a single political unit 
made up of six different regions, which effectively undermined the idea of the equal confederacy 
promoted by Lukashenko. Throughout 2003 and 2004 Russia pushed Belarus to privatize 
industries in the petrochemical/gas transit sectors, and threats were issued to hike prices if state-
companies were not privatized.  
 However, this period was not devoid of cooperation. In February of 2003 Russia 
proposed creating a Common Economic Space (CES) consisting of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Kazakhstan with a goal of eliminating trade barriers and having shared energy transport 
policies.
145 
In military matters, Russia joined with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Armenia to form the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in April 2003. 
 The precedent for future gas wars was set in February 2004, when Gazprom cut off 
supplies for a single day. Belarus agreed months later to a price hike from $27 to $46 per 
thousand cubic meters. Lukashenko actually turned the situation to his benefit however, when he 
portrayed himself as an independence fighter against Russian oligarchs (a code word for liberal 
businessmen in Russian politics).
146 
A deal was reached stipulating that subsidization prices 
would continue, but Gazprom must have a greater stake in the Belarusian pipeline company 
Beltransgaz. In September of 2004 Lukashenko also used the Beslan crisis to his advantage when 
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he stated that his term limits must be removed in order to keep Belarus peaceful and free from 
such terrorism. At this pivotal moment the Kremlin silenced critics of Belarus throughout the 
media, and later congratulated Lukashenko on his victory for passing the referendum on 
removing his term limits. 
 In October of 2004 another election occurred in Belarus, this time in regards to a 
referendum which essentially gave Lukashenko unlimited power. Putin again called to 
congratulate Lukashenko on his electoral victory.
147
 Sergei Ivanov stated, in response to 
Condoleezza Rice meeting with opposition Belarusian candidates, that: ―we would not, of 
course, be advocating what some people call regime changes anywhere […] We think the 
democratic process, the process of reform cannot be imposed from the outside.‖
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Putin‘s second term marked the high-point of Russian-Belarusian relations (and 
incidentally the apex of siloviki factional power). After being put on the defensive by Ukraine‘s 
Orange Revolution in late 2004, Russia from 2005 to 2007 actively tried to undermine OSCE 
observer missions in order to support its ―authoritarian axis.‖ Media spin supported these 
governments as well, usually under the guise of anti-terrorism. In May 2005 siloviki strongman 
and FSB leader Patrushev (allied with the Sechin clan) ―unmasked‖ a plot by the West to use 
terrorist organizations to finance Belarusian opposition.
149
 In addition to this, FSB officers aided 
their Belarusian counterparts (the KGB) in getting leads on opposition activists who smuggled 
banned literature during the previous election, while Russian media actively discredited the 
Belarusian opposition.
150 
Despite this deepening political cooperation between the two countries, gas wars broke 
out in 2006 when Gazprom stated it needed much more than the $46 Belarus was paying at the 
time. This was not the first time that Gazprom had threatened to raise prices, as it occurred in 
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2002 and 2004 as well. The earlier deal signed in 2004 stated that Gazprom would have a stake 
in Beltransgaz and that this stake would expire in 2006. Once 2006 had arrived Gazprom offered 
to extend subsidy-level prices in exchange for ownership of Beltransgaz, which Belarus 
refused.
151
 Lukashenko consequently threatened a ―breakup of all relations.‖ 
Despite this posturing, in December of 2006 Belarus reached a deal with Gazprom just 
hours before Gazprom would have cut off the gas supply. Despite the deal, Russia then imposed 
a tariff on oil exports, to which Belarus responded with a transit tax being put on Russian oil 
moving westwards. Belarus then agreed to pay $100 (rather than a price ―three times‖ the 
original $46), in exchange for Gazprom receiving a 50% stake in Belarus‘s gas company 
Beltransgaz at the price of $2.5 billion.
152
  
Just as in the 2004 Belarusian elections, Belarusian and Russian political cooperation in 
2006 continues in the form of positive media coverage despite the economic arguments between 
the two countries. Belarusian elections in December of 2006 were similar to 2004, in that 
Russian media worked to sing the praises of Lukashenko while ignoring or discrediting the 
opposition. Just as in previous economic disagreements, relations eventually stabilized after a 
bargaining process, and by April of 2007 Russia spoke of a $1.5 billion ―stabilization loan‖ that 
was to be given to Belarus.
153
 Lukashenko responded by stating that Belarus and ―the brotherly 
Russian people‖ would stand together and face their mutual threats. By the end of 2007 subsidy-
level prices were still maintained. Just as in previous instances, economic disagreements were 
eventually pushed aside in order to focus on political and cultural cooperation.  
In 2009 the first Belarusian diplomatic row in the Medvedev-era occurred. June marked 
the outbreak of the ―milk war,‖ where Russia banned dairy products coming from Belarus. 
Lukashenko claimed that the ban was political in retaliation for Belarus not recognizing the 
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independence of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia following the 2008 Georgian war. To add to 
this, yet another round of the gas war started in July of 2009 when Belarus cut Latvia off from 
Russian oil. In August Lukashenko travels to Moscow ―to restore ties‖
154
 though later RT articles 
show this attempt largely failed in that RT states that Lukashenko ―jeopardises‖ [sic] any 
breakthroughs or talks.
155 
Unlike the gas wars of 2004 and 2006 the gas wars of 2009 do not 
mend shortly after their outbreak. In May 2010 RT stated that Belarus is ―thought‖ to pay $150 
per 1000 cubic meters of gas (though this is projected/threatened to rise in the near future).
156
 By 
the end of May Belarus offered for Gazprom to fully control Beltransgaz, in hopes of receiving 
domestic-level-prices on gas coming from Russia.  
Despite this gesture on the part of Lukashenko, in early July of 2010 state-owned NTV in 
Russia showed a highly critical documentary about Lukashenko, accusing him of fostering a 
dictatorship. In the same month three Belarusian opposition candidates visited Moscow and met 
with liberals such as Kudrin and Chubais.
157
 With the high-point of Belarusian-Russian relations 
during the 2004 Belarusian elections now a distant memory, by December of 2010 relations had 
reached their nadir as Russian media decried the results of the election and lent a voice for 
Belarusian opposition candidates.  
 
 
Gazprom: The State, Inc. 
 
It is difficult to assess any policy while omitting clear economic variables. Likewise, it is 
difficult to discuss Russian economic variables towards the CIS in general (and Ukraine and 
Belarus in particular) without a strong focus on Gazprom as a key economic interest group. 
Gazprom is a state-dominated joint stock corporation that (until 1992) was the Soviet Ministry of 
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the Gas Industry. When touting its economic achievements as ―the third biggest company in the 
world in terms of capitalization‖ Putin wasted no time in underlining the reasoning behind this 
success when he said its success ―did not just come about all on its own, but is the result of 
carefully planned action by the state.‖
158
  
Indeed, the Russian government, until recently, owned the majority (50.002%) of the 
company and the Board of Directors read as a veritable ―who‘s who‖ of Russian politics.  
 
Table 5: Gazprom in Government 
 
Board Director member Role in government 
Alexei Miller (CEO) Deputy Minister of Energy of Russia (former) 
Viktor Zubkov (chairman of the board) Prime-Minister (former), First Deputy Prime Minister  
Elvira Nabiullina Minister of Economic Development 
Viktor Khristenko First Deputy Prime Minister (former), Minister of Industry 
 
In addition to these former board members, one could include current President 
Medvedev and the fact that Gazprom was founded by former Prime Minister/Acting President 
Viktor Chernomyrdin (later demoted in 2009 to a presidential advisor until his death late in 
2010). A simple explanation underlies the weaving of state interest with petroleum interest in 
that the importance of petroleum to Russia is hard to overstate. Russia was leading the world in 
the production of petroleum at the onset of the 20
th
 century, after which the United States took 
over, after which by 1975 Russia again took the lead.
159
 Saudi Arabia took the lead in 1992 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has held it until 2007 when Russia again took the 
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lead with Gazprom at the forefront. At the time that this lead was taken oil made up 30% of the 
GDP and 65% of the export total.
160
  
Gazprom was the poster-company of the drive to nationalize major Russian industries. 
While a few companies (like Rosneft) have always been state owned others followed Gazprom‘s 
suit to become ―national champions‖ in the words of Putin. Gazprom is recognized as the leader 
of the national champions, and the trajectory towards Russian energy dominance coincides with 
the rise of the Russian state‘s dominance over its own economy. While in 2000 the share of 
nationally-produced oil that was produced by state-enterprises was as low as 10%, by 2007 this 
figure had risen to nearly 50%.
161
  




 “Putin‟s first priority was to purge the self-dealers and asset-strippers from Gazprom. He 
seems instinctively to have recognized that Gazprom would make an ideal flagship, on the 
assumption, of course, that he could find managers who would place the interests of the state 
above their own” and “that is why almost immediately after his election as president, Putin 
sought to put managers in place who would no longer strip off producing assets into their 
privately held empires.” 
 
Gazprom is important in that it reflects the need to analyze foreign policy autonomy. 
Here ―autonomy‖ is defined by Tsygankov‘s methodology: one can compare proclaimed foreign 
policy goals to actual foreign policy implementation, in order to identify any gaps, and then see 
if any of these gaps would benefit a key interest group.
163
 If hostile rhetoric towards Belarus 
increases but foreign policy is increasingly cooperative this gap merits scrutiny. Considering the 
importance of Gazprom as a key economic variable, I propose to look at gas prices for Belarus to 
be used as a key control variable. It is in Gazprom‘s interest to get as much financial benefit as 
possible, therefore to charge the highest possible gas prices. If liberal identity is on the retreat 
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and yet if relative prices continue to rise and the situation with Belarus grows more unforgiving 
and antagonistic, then Gazprom‘s economic dominance can offer a key alternate hypothesis 
pertaining to Russian foreign policy.  
Gazprom‘s history is one of a company that started as a personal goldmine for its owners. 
The transitory period from 2000 onwards was sparked by Putin cleaning house. In particular, he 
sought to remove members of the board and replace them with more loyal members from the 
siloviki and his clan circle in St. Petersburg. 2000 marked the removal of Chernomyrdin from the 
board and his replacement with Medvedev. In 2001 the notoriously corrupt Rem Vyakhirev was 
replaced with Miller (who, like Putin, also worked for the mayor of St. Petersburg). Putin was 
not the first to try to clean house at Gazprom. Before him Fedorov (the Minister of Finance) tried 
and failed. The aforementioned Vyakhirev went so far as to send the mafia to harass Boris 
Fedorov (and they eventually poisoned his dog supposedly) and paid for Moscow newspapers to 
smear his character.
164
 When Putin replaced Vyakhirev with Miller, one of Miller‘s first acts was 
to separate Gazprom from ITERA, a Florida-based partner that acted as a middleman dealing 
with Ukraine, the Caucasus countries, and others. By 2006 ITERA was forced to sell their stake 
(51 percent) in Sibneftegaz to Gazprom for the bargain price of $130 million. When Miller 
became the CEO for Gazprom nearly two-thirds of the property acquired by ITERA was seized 
by Gazprom, presumably with Putin‘s blessing.
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                There have been numerous incidents of institutional corruption being a part of the 
landscape of Russian politics. Often, companies have huge sums of money essentially vanish, as 
was the case when Transneft paid $530 million to unnamed/unknown charities in 2007-2008, a 
sum larger than what was spent on repairing its pipeline. Gazprom also exhibited this 
phenomenon of seemingly irrational financial behavior by selecting an intermediary named 
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Transinvestgas to deal with Novatek, when Novatek offered a deal that cut out the middleman of 
Transinvestgas for a cost which would have been 70 percent less for Gazprom.
166
 In spring 2011 
Medvedev signed a decree preventing government ministers from simultaneously holding 
positions on boards of major companies. Despite his intentions to curb corruption, ministers 
chose their own replacements and Rosneft even released a defiant statement saying ―Sechin will 
keep control and […] will even strengthen it.‖
167
 In this sense even a ―national champion‖ in the 
form of Gazprom is not immune to factional struggles.  
 
The Case Of Gazprom: Marketization Or Blackmail? 
 
“Russia grudgingly accepts the Atlanticist choices of its neighbors but refuses to subsidize 
them.” – Dmitri Simes 
 
The notion of Russia/Gazprom using gas prices as a neo-imperialist economic club over 
the heads of non-compliant CIS members is prevalent among the Western media and scholars.
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Under this scenario Russia uses its monopolization of energy reserves to advance its policies. 
This realist focus on material power is contrasted with the Russian narrative on why gas prices 
have fluctuated in the first decade of the twenty-first century, with the exact prices depending on 
the country in question. While realists have portrayed the price to be reflective of how loyal the 
client state is to Russia (with disobedience being punished in the form of higher gas prices), 
Russia has taken a liberal approach (in terms of its rhetoric) in saying that rising prices are more 
a reflection of the fact that all countries have to pay fair market prices as Russia abandons the 
neo-Soviet subsidization-level pricing for client states. In February of 2007 Putin refuted the 
Western conception of a neo-imperialist energy blackmailing process, stating that: 
“We are constantly being fed the argument that Russia is using its current and emerging 
economic levers to achieve its foreign policy goals. […]This is not the case. The Russian 
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Federation has always abided by all of its obligations fully and completely, and it will continue 
to do so.”169  
 
While this is essentially true of Russia‘s relations with NATO countries going back to 
the Soviet Union up until the present-day, the same cannot be said of the USSR‘s relations with 
its allies/republics of the USSR itself, as there are nearly a dozen instances of the Soviet Union 
(and later Russia) using gas as a political/economic tool towards republics within their sphere of 
influence.
170
 The gas wars of the 2000s certainly lend the appearance of similar tactics.  
In fact this tactic has been used as a rationalization for why bilateral relations have been 
used more frequently (and with greater success) than multilateral arrangements, despite Russia‘s 
inclination to rhetorically praise multilateralism and the fact it belongs to multiple organizations 
that are built on a multilateral framework. This point was underscored when White stated that 
―given the dependence of the former Soviet states on Russian energy, achieving economic 
influence by forgiving debts in return for shares in local businesses has proved a more cost-




The practical application of this rising-price policy could be witnessed right away. In 
2007 Georgia agreed to pay the same price that Europe paid ($235 per 1000 cubic meters). As a 
result, by that same year Georgia managed to import 80% of its natural gas from non-Russian 
sources.
172
 The openly conflictual country of Georgia getting ―market‖ prices could be compared 
with a close ally like Belarus at first being asked to pay $200 (in January of 2007) but eventually 
Gazprom allowed them to pay a mere $100. Even this price was more than double what it was in 
2006, when the price was bargain-level $46 for Belarus. In addition to this price increase at the 





This price difference isn‘t simply a matter of discretionary income at the hands of the 
leaders of Belarus, but it is a source of legitimacy for Belarus. It has been put forward that 
Belarus‘s populism has had to become result-based in terms of its economy in order to refute an 
internationally hostile climate. Under these circumstances Lukashenko often depends on making 
direct economic comparisons to other CIS countries in order to justify his legitimacy.  Belarus 
ranked fourth among rates of development compared to other post-Soviet countries, as only the 
Baltics have fared better.
174
 This ―superiority through comparison‖ logic is crucial to the 
regime‘s legitimacy. 
             Under these circumstances price differences are crucial in that Belarus has depended on 
receiving subsidy-priced-petroleum that it can then resell (at an inflated price) to Western 
countries and use the profits to boost its economy.
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 These economic boosts are a source of 
legitimacy for the Lukashenko regime as much as they are rational choices in boosting the 
economy, underlying how critical the subsidy-level prices are to the Lukashenko regime.  
The Russian export duty was counteracted with the imposition of a $45-per-ton transit fee 
on the petroleum Russia was sending to Western Europe (which up until recently had to go 
through either the Ukraine or Belarus). Since half the petroleum went through Belarus, this 
would have been quite costly for Russia. A week after this threat from Belarus was made, Russia 
lowered the $180 export duty to $53 and, in return, Belarus abandoned talk of their transit fee 
entirely. Even temporary lulls in conflict eventually would give way to new conflicts, however. 
Even though Lukashenko had agreed to pay higher prices by the middle of 2007 Belarus then 
began to fall behind on payments, and Russia was again threatening to cut off deliveries around 
this time.
176
 Belarus, again, paid the bill and gas flows resumed once again. This back-and-forth 
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illustrates that the market relations between Belarus and Gazprom (and by extension, Russia) 
were anything but stable.  
It has been asserted that by the mid-2000s the moves to change Ukraine‘s prices were 
reflective of an effort to give Ukraine market (instead of bargain) prices in addition to punish the 
political insubordination of the Orange Revolution.
177
 Similarly, Gazprom cancelled the bargain 
price towards Belarus in 2006-2007, instead doubling the price to $100 per 1000 cubic meters 
and later getting a 50% stake in Belarus's state oil company Beltransgaz.
178
  The net gain from 
the Ukraine and Belarus deals was $4 billion, or 2% of the budget.  
By late 2008 arguments erupted over whether Ukraine had siphoned off gas from the 
Russian pipelines leading to Western Europe. This caused the supply of natural gas to be cut off 
in January of 2009, causing a shortage in Western Europe for a brief period during the winter. 
This incident was not without precedent… gas supplies were cut off to the Ukraine in the winter 
of 2005-2006 and the winter of 2006-2007. The difference in the cut-off of 2009 was that in this 
instance it was ordered by Prime Minster Putin himself, 
“not the head of Gazprom, which suggested that the cutoff may have been motivated by foreign 
policy goals – to further weaken Ukraine as it struggled through its own financial and 
economic crisis and to punish it for its pro-Western orientation.”179 
 
 Gazprom and the Kremlin here seem to be intertwined to the point where it is difficult to 
separate the two. Whether Gazprom is in control of Russia‘s foreign policy can only be answered 
by looking at the answers given by the data. Did identity shifts occur to accompany the factional 
shifts at the pinnacle of power in 2008-2009? Were the liberal attacks on Belarus in Russia 
Today simply rhetorical justifications for Russia waging a war to extract as much profit as 
possible from Belarus? Or were they more reflective of a genuine shift in Russia‘s foreign policy 
brought about by a shift in Russian identity?   
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A Look At The Framing Of The Split With Belarus 
 
 Before analyzing general RT stories which shed light on whether liberal rhetoric is 
systemic in Russian media or whether it is simply a rhetorical device to criticize an illiberal state, 
attention must first be focused on the change in reporting towards Belarus itself. This is 
important, since changes in foreign policy in this study have been measured in terms of 
endorsements made publicly about the perceived legitimacy of the Lukashenko regime. The 
focus of this research catalogues RT stories from the span of 2006 to 2010.The start date of 
reporting (July 2006) was chosen for two reasons: one reason of necessity and one of theory. 
Necessity was due to the fact that RT stories before July 2006 could not be retrieved, and in 
terms of theory 2006 was ideal in that it preceded the siloviki split of 2007 and the subsequent 
siloviki fall from grace in 2008-2009 under Medvedev. Thus this period captures how rhetoric 
was used at the height of siloviki power, and presumably the dominance of the statist identity 
that accompanied the elite with backgrounds in the security services.  
The end date of 2010 was chosen for several reasons as well. First it captures a period in 
which liberal rhetoric should be more prevalent relative to earlier time periods. Secondly, 
choosing 2010 as an end date is helpful in that it was a time before key liberal leaders were 
reined in following the 2011 announcement of Putin‘s upcoming presidential run in 2012. In 
2011 several events occurred that have indicated that civiliki (and possibly liberal identity) 
personnel were being scaled back. More on this will be discussed in the conclusion.  
The majority of 2010 news stories intimated that Medvedev would likely run for a second 





 of 2011 when Medvedev announced that Putin would run for president in 2012, 
with Medvedev planning to take up Putin‘s current position as Prime Minister. Two days after 
this announcement was made, Alexei Kudrin (the Minister of Finance and a well-known liberal 
who worked in St. Petersburg with Mayor Anatoly Sobchak) said he would only serve under a 
Medvedev presidency and would not serve under Putin, after which he was promptly asked to 
resign by Medvedev. This incident was not the last sign of a possible shift suddenly in favor of 
the siloviki at the expense of the civiliki. In December of 2011 formerly demoted Sergei Ivanov 
(a well-known representative of the siloviki) had his fortunes reversed and was suddenly 
promoted as Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Simultaneously, the now 
ousted Kudrin joined the liberal Illarionov (who resigned from government in protest in 2005) in 
embracing the opposition. Kudrin joined protesters against parliamentary elections seen as 
fraudulent by the West in December of 2011.
180
 Focusing on 2010 avoids the upcoming factional 
turbulence among the elite in the transition to a hypothetical third Putin term.  
The third reason 2010 was chosen was to analyze a period congruent with Belarusian 
elections. If the rhetoric in non-Belarus stories is significantly different in terms of identity from 
Belarusian stories, then it suggests that identities are being used simply as a rhetorical device in 
reporting on Belarus. The elections of 2010 serve as an ideal comparison between the two types 
of news stories (Belarus-centered and non-Belarus-centered).  
The fourth reason 2010 was chosen was to overcome organizational inertia. Since I have 
adopted Goldsmith‘s notion
181
 that schema are more difficult to change when adopted by a group 
(also echoed by Hampton et al, 1987), as well as Abdelal‘s notion of norms and habits being 
inseparable,
182
 it makes sense to pick a timeframe in which organizational inertia could be 
overcome over time and the resulting changes in rhetoric could be implemented. After all, elite 
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predominance is in a constant state of flux, as we can see above in reference to both Alexei 
Kudrin and Sergei Ivanov following Putin‘s recent announcement, and many of the top liberal 
personnel were not fully situated in their current positions of power until 2009. If there was 
indeed a connection between liberal rhetoric in a state-owned outlet such as RT and factional 
dominance at top levels in the Kremlin, it would presumably take time for the new liberal 
personnel to consolidate their positions, new liberal personnel to gain dominance over RT 
personnel, and RT personnel to modify their reporting to reflect new preferences on the part of 
the state. This uncertain timeframe can be mitigated by fast-forwarding through a year with such 
organizational inertia (such as 2008 or 2009 for instance) towards one where these contradictions 
have been largely resolved in 2010.  
The first thing one notices when looking at RT articles is the consistency in positive 
coverage of Belarus, even during periods of diplomatic strife. In late 2006 gas wars between 
Belarus and Russia erupted, and diplomacy became especially strained. Despite this, coverage 
was kept quite civil. Despite a report that acknowledged the existence of an opposition (a 
December 12, 2006 story was written on an Belarusian opposition member receiving a human 
rights prize from the European Union, perhaps not coincidentally during the gas wars) none of 
the critiques levied against Belarus in 2006 were of a political nature. The majority of the 
coverage was based on economic concerns (Belarus wanting subsidy level pricing while Russia 
wanted market-level prices) between the two countries. In January of 2007 Russia and Belarus 
were defined as being jointly criticized by the international organization PACE. However, in 
March of 2007 the existence of a Belarusian opposition was covered and then in April it was 
noted that during the 10
th
 anniversary of talks of a Union State, the gas wars had ―poured cold 
water‖ on the idea to dampen its enthusiasm.
183
 This negative coverage was followed by a 
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―Russians rate their friends‖ poll
184
 which asked Russians which country they viewed as the 
friendliest with Russia. The leader was Kazakhstan (at 39%) followed closely by Belarus (at 
38%, down from 46% in 2005). Shortly afterwards positive coverage was demonstrated in that a 
story on the independence day of Belarus was reported
185
 as well as announcements that a 
Polish-linked spy ring had been uncovered operating in Belarus. It was reported that the Polish 
spy-ring‘s liquidation ―prevented the damage to the defense capability of Russia and the 
Republic of Belarus.‖
186
 By October there were reports of ―trade booming with Belarus‖
187
 and 
that ―Belarus may host Russian missiles‖ which stated that the ―Iskander system deployment 
would be in response to U.S. ABM plans in Europe.‖
188
 There is a continuation of positive 




Medvedev won the Russian election on March 2, 2008. Articles on Belarus immediately 
following (just as before) are certainly mixed. There are reports of arrests of opposition members 
(described as ―protesters‖) on one hand
190
 and yet a demonization of some opposition members 
as being fascists training at ―right-wing Ukrainian military camps‖ on the other.
191
 During the 
parliamentary elections in Belarus in September of 2008 RT covered a variety of positions. One 
article covered that opposition accused Belarus of rigging the vote
192
 and yet others painted the 
opposition as especially weak.
193
 The fact that Belarus, after its elections, chose not to recognize 
the independence of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia may have certainly hampered relations. The 
rationalization given
194
 for why Belarus would not cooperate with Russia in this regard was, 
interestingly, described in rather non-liberal critiques:  
“So far, Belorusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko has stopped at providing nothing more 
than verbal support to the Russian leadership whilst playing for time. His behaviour was 
largely explained by Europe-oriented ambitions. In August and September the recent 
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parliamentary campaign in Belarus – an important factor in curing Belarusian ties with the 
West – was gathering pace.”  
 
This line of reasoning seems to frame the actions of Belarus in the scope of national-
interest (a Belarusian interest in growing closer to liberal Europe at that). Seeming to buttress 
this tendency of chalking up differences to conflicting national interests (rather than conflicting 
identities), Russia lent Belarus two billion dollars
195
 in order to aid them in getting through ―the 
financial crisis.‖ Even more interesting is that this was followed by an article called ―Top Ten 
Myths about Belarus‖
196
 which sought to deconstruct all the major Western ―myths‖ slandering 
Belarus.  
The first shift towards criticism of the authoritarian tendencies of Belarus (in other words, 
criticisms of Belarusian identity) occurred in late 2008 in an article titled ―Belarus state films 
made mandatory.‖
197
 This liberal-toned piece can be seen as all the more schizophrenic in terms 
of framing considering the positive pieces that preceded it. What is interesting about this article 
was the subject of its framing in that it emphasized the tendency of ideological regulation, seen 
as a chief sin of the Soviet-era in the minds of Russians regardless of their identity-orientation.
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The notion of tying Belarus to the Soviet-era made arguably its first appearance here, and this 
concept of tying Belarus to negative aspects of the Soviet past would become more and more 
frequent with time.  
Despite these occasional aberrations, however, coverage of Belarus as a whole was not 
yet heavily negative. In fact, rather interestingly, despite rhetoric becoming slightly more critical 
of Belarus in this timeframe, relations were still said to be strong. In an article titled ―Taking 
sides with pipelines‖
199
 RT proceeded to grade relations with many European countries. Those 
listed positively included continental Western European powers (Germany, Italy, and France in 
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addition to Finland and Greece) and some CIS countries (Belarus where the relationship was 
labeled as being one of ―brother-states‖, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Moldova). Those listed 
negatively were all countries on the Russian periphery (Ukraine which was described as 
―disastrous‖, Poland, Georgia, Latvia and Estonia). The remaining countries were classified in 
neutral terms (mostly Central/Eastern European countries). Interestingly, the schema of the 
periphery being viewed as especially dangerous and an endorsement of bilateral cooperation with 
powerful countries (like the continental powers) fits into what one would expect of the 
theoretical outcome of a statist Russian foreign policy. Incidentally, at this time (the beginning of 
2009) Russia was just emerging from the statist foreign policy enacted during Putin‘s second 
term. Despite cooperation between Russia and Belarus, in terms of joint membership in the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), a 
steady increase in articles critical of the politics of Belarus began to develop in 2009.  
A clear example of this came in the form of manipulations of quotation marks. The title 
of ―Europe‘s last dictatorship‖ has been an epithet reserved for Belarus by Western media 
sources. This coverage often highlights the Soviet identity of Belarus as well as the authoritarian 
tendencies of Lukashenko in general.
5,6,7
 In this period the quotation marks were frequently used 
to issue a statement without actually being culpable. For instance, the article ―hockey coach fired 
after beating ‗Belarusian tyrant‘‖
200
 which described the fact that a coach was fired for beating 
the president‘s hockey team. 
While this phrase (―Europe‘s last dictator‖) was absent from RT reporting before 
Medvedev was president, it made its first RT appearance on September 28
th
 of 2008 (roughly 
four-and-a-half months after Medvedev became president) when the phrase was described as 
being how the West refers to Belarus. The phrase made a total of three appearances in 2008, 
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always in context of a quotation as to how the West refers to Belarus. The use of quotes was also 
present in all five appearances of the phrase in 2009. The phrase was used eleven times in 2010.  
It was in 2009 when criticism of the domestic politics of Belarus became the norm, 
particularly the authoritarian nature of Belarusian power. When RT stated that the ―autocratic 
instinct allows Lukashenko to go over all kinds of ethical or ideological limits‖
201
 or when 
Lukashenko was quoted as saying that Kudrin (the liberal Foreign Minister of Russia) was 
“completely conspiring with hoodlums from our opposition and hoping to teach us how to 
work‖
202
 there was an element of ideological alienation that was missing from earlier reporting 
on Belarus. In fact, in an article the next day (June 4, 2009) an interesting point was brought up 
when Lukashenko was quoted as saying Kudrin was one of the ―hoodlums who bark for Western 
money and teach us how to work‖ and the article followed up by stating that: “Prime Minister 
Putin also to a certain extent criticized Kudrin, but President Medvedev spoke in full support of 
him.‖
203
 This notion of a difference amongst the Russian elite (often hidden from public view) 
was especially prescient in that Kudrin‘s splintering with the administration and subsequent 
resignation was just over a year away at this time. Interestingly, it has been suggested ―that those 
that lose bureaucratic battles to the point where no career resuscitation is possible have no choice 
but to join the opposition.‖204 
There were negative articles before the middle of 2009 (as evidenced by the adoption of 
the ―last dictatorship‖ phrase starting in 2008), but in particular it was following this period 
(mid-2009) where there was a nearly exclusive use of liberal critiques of Belarus used by RT. A 
May 28, 2009 headline stated ―goodbye to the idea of Union State‖, and shortly thereafter (June 
3
rd
) an exclusively liberal critique was printed quoting Alexei Kudrin (who has since joined the 
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opposition against Putin). From mid-2009 onwards this tendency continues in earnest and it 
accompanied the worsening relations in the form of the mid-2009 ―milk wars‖ and critical 
statements issued by Foreign Minister Lavrov.  
When analyzing the whole of RT reporting on Belarus and looking at Ukraine as well, an 
overall shift towards consistent negative reporting against Belarus begins approximately in the 
middle of 2009, while a shift in favor of Ukraine begins in January of 2010. The period of 
Ukraine going from a regularly antagonistic description to a positive one has a simple 
hypothetical explanation-- pro-Russian Yanukovych winning the 2010 election to replace the 
previous administration that was tied to the Orange Revolution. Yanukovych won the election on 
January 17, and then won the runoff against Tymoshenko on February 7. While this rhetorical 
shift seems logical after Ukrainian elections resulted in a more pro-Russian government, the 
antagonistic shift against Belarus is more difficult to explain. As an authoritarian state, 
Belarusian elections had little effect on changes in political life.  
While at the end of 2006 the cessation of the gas wars gave way to a mending process 
where past transgressions were overlooked, once the milk wars ended (the most tense period of 
the process  resolved itself by June 18
th
 of 2009) hostile rhetoric not only did not abate, but was 
used more and more frequently. Articles like ―Belarus‘ irreplaceable president in office after 15 
years‖
205
 and another article the same day which stated that Lukashenko was embarking on a 
―neo-Soviet‖ project tend to reflect an increasingly liberal critique with regards to Belarus, 
focused on human rights
206
 and Belarusian authoritarianism.  Articles such as ―web surfers 
beware: Lukashenko is watching you‖ (February 2, 2010), ―Lukashenko uses CSTO membership 
to blackmail Russia‖, ―Belarusian opposition journalist‘s death not suicide – colleague‖ 
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(September 9, 2010), and ―Belarus guilty of political repression – UN human rights watchdog‖ 
(October 12, 2010) described Belarus throughout 2010.  
July 2, 2010 was the first time the phrase ―Europe‘s last dictator‖ was applied without 
quotation marks, instead being used as a statement of fact (when the headline of the article was 
called ―Belarusian President Lukashenko – Europe‘s last dictator‖). By this time RT sounded 
akin to a Western media outlet: 
“Lukashenko rules his country with an iron fist. After all but wiping out the opposition, he 
changed the constitution in October 2004, allowing him to run for the presidency an unlimited 
number of times.” 
 
What followed was an association with arch-rival Georgia in an article titled 
―Lukashenko & Saakashvili merge in duet against Russia.‖
207
 A telling article by the name of 
―Lukashenko sees no point in talking to Moscow‘s ‗super-billionaires,‘‖ reflected the notion that 
not only did RT use liberal critiques towards Lukashenko, but that Lukashenko himself wanted 
to paint his troubles with Russia in terms of a critique against liberal identities. The term ―super-
billionaires,‖ like the commonly used ―oligarchs,‖ is an epithet for the ruling (and especially 
liberal) caste in Russia, especially prevalent in neo-Soviet-identity-style news sources.  
            As a portend of things to come, the July article stated that ―Russia may support 
Lukashenko‘s opponent in Belarusian elections‖
208
 and described opposition candidates meeting 
with famous liberals Kudrin and Chubais (the architect of liberal reforms in the 1990s). 
Interestingly, in the same article, Zyuganov (head of the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation) was quoted as condemning Moscow‘s policy on Belarus in that it was ―so strikingly 
at odds with our country's national interests,‖ which accurately sums up how a statist-identity-
centered (or perhaps more accurately, a neo-Soviet identity) critique of Russia‘s foreign policy 
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towards Belarus might sound. Romanchuk, chairman of the United Civil Party (an opposition 
group in Belarus), and author of the 2007 book ―Liberalism: Ideology of a Happy Person,‖ was 
mentioned in the July article and then was personally interviewed and covered by RT in August 
in the article ―‘Our program lies in the Kremlin.‘‖
209
 His free-market message was set up in the 




The promotion of an actual opposition candidate in 2010, while the opposition was 
essentially ignored in 2006 marked a dramatic shift in Russia‘s treatment of Belarus. Another 
article (Auguest 23, 2010) covered non-liberal opposition. It described Gaidukevich as similar to 
Zhirinovsky (the famous Russian nationalist/Eurasianist standard-bearer), though it did not 
provide the in-depth coverage that Romanchuk received. Romanchuk ended up receiving the 
third-most votes in the 2010 election (with approximately 2% of the vote). Of course, these 
figures were those reported by the Belarusian state and the election has not been ruled as free or 
fair by the OSCE.
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This notion of the elections not being free was echoed by RT. Articles included: 
―Opposition cries foul as Belarus starts early voting‖ (December 15, 2010); ―Belarus gears for 
‗foregone conclusion‘ presidential elections‖ (December 17, 2010); ―Belarus unlikely to escape 
from Lukashenko‘s iron grasp (anytime soon)‖ (December 19, 2010); ―Thousands protest 
presidential election results in Belarus‖ (December 20, 2010); and ―Reign of ‗Europe's last 
dictator‘ not about to end at 16 years.‖ (December 21, 2010) Similarly, post-election articles 
ended with stories that were sharply critical of Belarus and its track record on human rights. 
Surrounding the time of Belarusian elections near the end of 2010, various news videos accused 
Lukashenko of vote rigging
212





That RT articles grew increasingly critical of Belarus is undeniable. To answer the question of 
why articles grew more hostile, the data on identity must be analyzed. 
 
Statism Whithering?: A Look At The Data 
 
 While the methodology of my model was covered in chapter II, it nonetheless deserves 
some fleshing out of specifics as to the data. The table below illustrates the measurements I used 
to identify  ―liberal‖ and ―statist‖ rhetoric. For these references I used descriptions of identity 
from leading scholars such as Tsygankov and Hopf. The ―liberal‖ rhetoric was chosen to best 
reflect those of the ―National Democrat‖ identity. In terms of clan politics this identity is often 
associated with the intelligentsia (alongside Westernizers) and the professional classes. This 
identity has been tied to what I have called the ―civiliki‖: the economic modernizers and 
technocrats (often from Saint Petersburg) that are often associated with the Medvedev 
administration. The ―statist‖ rhetoric focuses on the conservative worldview that accompanies 
those often associated with the siloviki/security services. The notions of the balance of power, 
pragmatism in foreign policy (in that an authoritarian axis could be just as useful, depending on 
circumstances, as a brotherhood of democracies), and security/state stability being first among 
priorities all fit into the statist schema. Using methodologies discussed in chapter II derived from 
Hopf and Tsygankov in particular,
21
 I have divided two contrasting rhetorical treatments of 
major issues of policy (regarding multilateralism, political stability, etc.) among liberal and 






Table 6: Rhetoric as Identity Indicators 
 
Topic in question Liberal rhetorical focus Statist rhetorical focus 
Security Emphasis on mutual security Prioritization on national 
security-first and foremost 
Economic modernization Method of promoting 
similarities with the West 
Method of competing with 
other states/materialism being 
a prime mover of foreign 
policy 
Multipolarity In context of international 
institutions 
In context of national 
interests/sovereignty 
Views of the West Cooperative Competitive 
Soviet past Refutation of past Boasting of past 
Lateralism in negotiations Endorsing multilateralism Endorsing bilateralism 
Focus on social power Endorsing 
social/infrastructural 
development 
Endorsing a strengthening of 
authoritative/state power 
Domestic opposition Coverage in context of 
political pluralism 
Coverage in context of planted 
Western agents 
Social mobilization Endorsing dynamism / 
mobilization in domestic 
politics 
Endorsing staticity / stability 
in domestic politics 
Pragmatism N/A (not used) Pragmatism in foreign policy 
 
The only exception to this pattern is on the issue of pragmatism, usually reserved as a tag 
line to say ―whatever works in our national interests is good.‖ This concept is qualified as statist, 
whereas it has no rhetorical equivalent in terms of a liberal identity. Descriptive statements were 
not counted, only prescriptive/analytical statements. For instance, a news story stating what was 
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discussed at six-party talks over Korea would not be counted as a statement in support of 
multilateralism, while a news story discussing how multilateralism through the UN would aid 
Europe economically and culturally would count as a statement in support of multilateralism. 
The difference between these two hypothetical stories is that one is merely descriptive (and thus 
merely reflects recent events) while the other is prescriptive and reveals how the world is 
analyzed by the writers. Only the latter category of stories is quantified, lest I bias my data in 
favor of multilateralism just because multiple meetings were held at six-party talks in Korea in 
the month of December. This focus on the prescriptive/analytical also lends weight to the ability 
to view RT coverage as reflective of identity/factional dominance within the state that controls 
the reporting, rather than simply being reflective of descriptions of political decisions that have 
already been made. 
Whenever an article makes a statement that can be identified as being indicative of 
identity and to fit into one of the above two categories, there are four different categorizations I 
have used, as outlined by the table below: 
Table 7: Typology of Rhetorical Measurements 
 
 Primary focus of article Secondary focus/mentioned 
in passing 
Endorsement/analytical tool A B 
Vilification/signifier of Other C D 
 
By applying a differentiation between primary and secondary focuses of articles one can 
get an idea of if the rhetoric is being promoted as a major focus or if it is mentioned merely in 
habitual instances. For instance, an American neo-conservative in the early 2000s might have 
79 
 
written an article laden with assumptions of mutually exclusive national interests. Countries are 
―with us or against us‖: which inevitably creates a dualistic worldview excluding the conceptual 
basis of neutrality, of disinterested parties, or of a plurality of interests, or of a state to have the 
capacity to be ―with‖ another state on one issue while disagree with the state on another issue-- 
instead reducing international relations to a hegemonic binary of ―us‖ against ―them‖ 
monopolizing all relations/interactions under such an outlook. However, very rarely would such 
an article point to the premise of mutually exclusive national interests explicitly as the main 
focus of the article. In this instance the habitual usage of identity rhetoric (―with us or against 
us‖) is reflective of use of neo-conservative rhetoric governing the logic/rules of the articles, 
whereas a primary focus of an article (for example, ―government support of NPR hurts the free 
market economy‖) is a more transparent endorsement of an American conservative worldview 
where the rhetorical viewpoint is the focus of the article itself. It was with this in mind that I 
counted instances that are either an endorsement of, or the use of an analytical tool, as the main 
focus of an article as being categorized as an ―A‖ article. To stick with the example of American 
conservatism, a hypothetical article about funding of NPR being an unsound economic policy 
would be an ―A‖ article whereas an article which makes use of the ―with us or against us‖ 
(usually mentioned in passing in the article) mutually-exclusive-national-interest thought process 
as an ingrained logic of international relations would count as a ―B‖ instance.  
Furthermore, in order to avoid counting mere redundancy as increased rhetorical focus, I 
have not counted repeated uses of ―B‖ instances of the same rhetorical point in the same article. 
So for instance, if an article is especially redundant in endorsing notions of multipolar 
cooperation in the context of powerful nation-states operating bilaterally to achieve their 
individual interests and uses this concept three times throughout a single article for the sake of 
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emphasis, I only count it once, so as to avoid one especially redundant article statistically 
offsetting several less redundant/more concise articles.  
Finally is the instance of ―C‖ and ―D‖ statements. While an open endorsement or use of a 
certain form of analysis of the world is reflective of one discursive formation being applied, it 
makes little sense to count a vilification of an identity as being reflective of that identity in the 
reporting. For instance, if an article explicitly demonizes those who promote cooperation with 
the West (specifically because cooperation with the West is viewed as being indicative of the 
―Other‖ for instance) then it makes little sense to count that as an ―A‖ or ―B‖ instance of liberal 
rhetoric, even though technically a mention of cooperation with the West was made. Then again, 
it doesn‘t quite make sense to invert the value and count it as an ―A‖ or ―B‖ instance for statist 
rhetoric either, since the article didn‘t explicitly endorse a conflictual zero-sum worldview 
towards the West. To invert the value would make sense if only two identities existed in Russian 
discourse, but as we saw in chapter II, there are at least five separate discourses operating within 
the state of Russia alone. It is for this reason that I have created ―C‖ and ―D‖ instances, for 
vilifications of a rhetorical outlook as either the primary focus of the article, or the 
habitual/secondary focus of the article respectively. In the above example, a vilification of 
someone (or anyone) advocating cooperation with the West would not be an ―A‖ or ―B‖ instance 
for either liberal notions of the West or for statist notions of the West, but rather a ―C‖ or ―D‖ 
(reflecting whether it was the primary or secondary focus, respectively) instance only for 
cooperation with the West (so a liberal rhetorical device). While I believe ―C‖ and ―D‖ instances 
are important (in that they reveal what is being suggested is the ―Other‖) I do not count them 
statistically towards being reflective of either liberal or statist rhetoric, specifically because there 
are more than two discursive formations. Since there are more than two fruits in the world if one 
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was to analyze consumption of apples and bananas it would make little sense to count the 
statement ―I just ate a fruit that was not an apple‖ as an instance of eating a banana, since the 
speaker could very well have eaten a kiwi.  
Finally, the time frame chosen, as mentioned in chapter II, is December 2006 and 
December 2010 respectively. December 2010 was chosen to contrast it with the liberal coverage 
on Belarus (these stories were omitted from the model of course) the same month. If liberal 
statements in December 2010 were absent from the news in general while liberal rhetorical 
devices were used frequently in criticizing Belarus, then one could assume the rhetoric was just 
that: rhetoric alone. While the previous coverage of Belarusian elections (in March 2006) might 
have been helpful, RT articles are only available with a wide selection approximately mid-way 
through 2006 (RT came into existence at the end of 2005). In addition to the fact that March 
2006 articles are not available, December 2006 is ideal in that it controls for seasonal media 
coverage relative to December 2010. For instance, if there is an anniversary specifically in 
December that commemorates Soviet soldiers (which then likely spawns more stories idealizing 
Soviet life in December relative to March) then the lack of seasonal consistency (and the 
holidays that accompany such an inconsistency) could bias the data. In the aforementioned case, 
it would bias December in terms of statist rhetoric (idealization of Soviet past). Looking at the 
more than 500 articles from December of 2006 and December of 2010 not only provides an 
adequate sample size, but it also provides a control for seasonal celebrations and the rhetorical 
shifts that might result from choosing two timeframes with different months. 
If the increased liberal rhetoric applied towards Belarus in 2010 is reflective of an 
increased liberal identity on the part of the media (which is owned by the state), then we should 
expect liberal uses of rhetoric to increase outside of reporting on Belarus. If it does not increase 
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(or decreases!) then we can assume that the liberal rhetoric used with Belarus was simply a 
method of propaganda, more specifically using liberal rhetoric to criticize a decidedly illiberal 
state such as Belarus. If, however, liberal rhetoric noticeably rises, we can assume there is a shift 
in Russian identity and that this shift may have prompted the corresponding shift in rhetoric (and, 
in turn, relations) towards the illiberal state of Belarus. In fact, the data reveals just such an 
increase in liberal rhetoric from 2006 to 2010.  
Table 8: Rhetorical Breakdown for 2006 and 2010 
 
 2006 (25 total statements) 2010 (53 total statements) 
Liberal rhetoric 12% (3 statements) 64.2% (34 statements) 
Statist rhetoric 88% (22 statements) 35.8% (19 statements) 
 
An initial concern before I actually quantified my data was if the shift occurred but occurred by a 
relatively insignificant amount. This would reflect an inability to state whether liberal identity was 
increasing (or decreasing) or remained unchanged with any degree of certainty. If anything however, the 
opposite occurred and the change was drastic. The 2006 articles used almost no liberal rhetoric (12%) and 
were dominated by statist rhetoric (88%). By comparison, in 2010, liberal rhetoric had gone from nearly 
nonexistent to the majority (64%) while statist rhetoric, while still being used, had plunged (36%)  
relative to total statements. In 2006 a total of 310 articles were analyzed, while in 2010 a total of 196 
articles were analyzed. To compare the breakdown of exactly how many instances occurred in each time 




Table 9: 2006 Rhetorical Usages 
 
Topic in question Liberal instances Statist instances 
Security none BB (2) 
Economic modernization none BBB (3) 
Multipolarity none BBBAA (5) 
Views of the West none BBB (3) 
Soviet past B (1) B (1) 
Lateralism in negotiations none B (1) 
Focus on social power B (1) none 
Domestic opposition B (1) B (1) 
Social mobilization none BBB (3) 
Pragmatism N/A BBB (3) 
 
Table 10: 2010 Rhetorical Usages 
 
Topic in question Liberal instances Statist instances 
Security BBBBBAB (7) DDB (1, 2 exceptions) 
Economic modernization AB (2) AD (1, 1 exception) 
Multipolarity BBA (3) BBDDDABB (5, 3 exceptions) 
Views of the West ABBA (4) AAD (2, 1 exceptions) 
Soviet past BBBB (4) BBB (3) 
Lateralism in negotiations B (1) BB (2) 
Focus on social power BBABB (5) BB (2) 
Domestic opposition ABBAA (5) none 
Social mobilization ABB (3) BBB (3) 
Pragmatism N/A none 
  
2006 was a year in which the main stories focused on the death of Litvinenko and the 
prosecution of his case, in addition to the expansion of Gazprom into new markets and its 
ongoing marketization process. The main focuses of 2010 were the ratification of START, 
WikiLeaks revealing NATO‘s (often unsavory) views of Russia, the guilty verdict for 
Khodorkovsky, and decisions for the upcoming 2012 elections, (often intimating that Medvedev 
is the most likely candidate, though the articles were always careful to point out Putin had not 
ruled out running) in addition to the Belarusian elections.  
The first thing to notice is the discrepancy between the two timeframes. 2006 had a near-
monopoly in terms of its rhetorical focus. Liberal rhetorical emphases on mutual security and 
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cooperation under the watch of international institutions were essentially nonexistent, while 
multipolarity in terms of countries (especially great powers) pursuing their national interests was 
especially prevalent (two times with an entire article devoted to the concept, and three secondary 
mentions). 2006 certainly mirrors the hypothesis put forward that this was a time of siloviki 
preponderance, both in terms of factional dominance at the elite level (as discussed in chapter 
III) and in terms of statist identity discourse through the state‘s mouthpiece in the media. Though 
statist rhetoric in 2006 outnumbers usages in 2010 in terms of absolute values and (by a massive 
margin) relative values, one interesting aspect is the fact that the total number of identity 
statements was nearly double (53) in 2010 what it was in 2006 (25). This seems to be reflective 
of RT‘s overall reporting style as much as anything, in that 2006 articles, while being more 
numerous overall, were more often focused on stories that were more descriptive in nature 
(sports stories, human interest stories, etc.) rather than analytical or exclusively political articles.  
               If one was to judge elite dominance on rhetoric alone (without looking at the data in 
chapter III), 2010 would offer a much more mixed message. That liberal hegemony at the elite 
level has not occurred indeed reinforces the notion of an identity-stalemate in addition to a 
factional-stalemate at the upper echelons of the Russian state. In addition to the mix between the 
two identities (64% for national democrats and 36% for statists) there appears to be confusion as 
to the narrative itself for some of the reporting. An isolated example would be the December 8
th
 
article authored by Surkov, who was seen as a key ideologist under Putin and the inventor of the 
term ―sovereign democracy.‖ Sandwiched in between liberal articles was the Surkov article 
extolling the virtues of modernization as a method to overtake Western competitors (the only 
time this rhetoric was used in a positive fashion in 2010) along with heavy emphasis on a 
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national sovereignty schema in which powerful states in particular act to enforce their 
sovereignties on the world stage. 
The identity schizophrenia (or perhaps, more accurately labeled, ―the balancing act‖) of 
2010, however, is most evident not in the isolated article of Surkov contrasted with other articles 
extolling the virtues of submitting to the authority of international institutions, but rather in 
articles where two positions are expressed at the same time. In a fascinating article (see appendix 
B for greater detail) titled ―Medvedev and Putin slam xenophobia‖ (December 27, 2010) the two 
leaders give their views on how to resolve ethnic conflicts within Russia in response to a soccer 
clash among ethnicities in Moscow which left one Chechen dead. What is interesting is that the 
leaders give not only alternate solutions, but solutions that are in direct conflict with one another 
(and solutions that are reflective of two separate identities, through Putin boasting of the 
effectiveness of the Soviet past while at the same time Medvedev explicitly rejected it): 
“Putin suggested using Soviet experience and teaching Russians patriotism, while Medvedev 
called the USSR „a very harsh state‟ and said that it is impossible go [sic] back to its 
practices.”215 
 
This notion of competing identities is also reflected in the issue of usages of ―C‖ and ―D‖ 
rhetoric as mentioned above. While there were no usages of ―C‖ rhetoric (in that it would be odd 
to explicitly refute a form of rhetoric as the main theme of an entire article) there were multiple 
usages of villainizations of rhetorical concepts in 2010. These exceptions are categorized in table 
10 above. While 2006 did not use a single example of ―exception‖ rhetoric 2010 made seven 
separate usages of ―exception‖ rhetoric, all of which were directed towards the statist identity. 
What is especially interesting in these cases is against whom the exceptions were directed. 
Before this issue is tackled, it would be helpful to view how each timeframe categorized the 
―Other‖ in terms of identity:  
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Table 11: What is Viewed as the "Other" 
 
 2006 2010 
International Other Baltics (Estonia in particular), 
US, UK, Western media, 
Georgia 
Georgia (vilified even more 
than it was in 2006), the 
Baltics, US, Kosovo 
Domestic Other Corrupt officials as 
individuals, traitors (including 
those related to Litvinenko 
and Berezovsky, Zakayev, 
Khodorkovsky) 
Corruption as a part of 
Russian culture, nationalists 
 
It is worth noting the appearance of nationalism as a domestic Other in 2010. While the 
dramatic increase in articles critical of nationalism (13, with 3 featuring the critique as the chief 
reason for the article itself, compared to only one critique in all of 2006) can partially be 
attributed to the events which spawned the critiques, (the death of the Chechen at the riot during 
the soccer game) many of these critiques were made entirely separate from the soccer incident in 
terms of what the article‘s story was centered on. In an article on December 23, 2010, a poll 
asking Russians who they considered to be the ―politician of the year‖ yielded three top results: 
Putin, Medvedev, and Zhirinovsky (leader of the Eurasianist/neo-fascist sop party LDPR). Even 
though Zhirinovsky is widely viewed in Russia as a Kremlin stooge to sop the demand for the 
nationalist vote in Russia, the article still discredited his ideology and chalked up his success 
only to him as an individual: 
“Even those who may not share his political views, registered him because of his enormous 
charisma. In a lot of ways that's the reason why he ended up third and not fifth for example."  
 Incidentally Zhirinovsky is used multiple times in 2010 as an ―Other‖ in contrast to 
Medvedev in terms of views on foreign policy. The Zhirinovsky approach is often used in a 
―threat‖ style, in that a level-headed request by (often) Medvedev (often stressing multilateralism 
and cooperation) is extended to the West but if it is refused the article intimates that there are 
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others who would advocate a more confrontational approach (followed by a Zhirinovsky quote 
endorsing realist critiques). In one instance it was Putin himself who offered the olive branch and 
simultaneously the realist-zero-sum-balance-and-security warning and who thus was 
simultaneously the good cop and the bad cop: 
“‟If our proposals [on a common missile defense shield] are met with only negative replies, 
and, on top of that, in the vicinity of our borders there is built additional threats in an already 
tense region, then Russia will be forced to ensure its security through different means and 
ways,‟ the premier affirmed. Concerning the possibility of an arms race breaking out over the 
issue, Putin stressed that nobody wanted to see such a scenario. 
„That's not our choice. We don't want that to happen. But this is not a threat on our part,‟ he 
said. „We've been simply saying that this is what all of us expects to happen if we don't agree 
on a joint effort there.‟”216 
In this way Putin paints a zero-sum response as being only desirable if his initial 
cooperative multilateralism is refuted by a distrusting West. When this ―threat‖ style is not the 
way exceptions are used exception-rhetoric is, alternatively, a straight-forward demonization 
style, usually directed at the Other. This was the case in both one instance of Zhirinovsky 
(nationalist, domestic Other) and the United States (international Other) being painted as 
advocates of a statist-rhetorical-position. 
Despite a simultaneous statist and liberal identity (often literally embodied in Medvedev 
and Putin in some articles, as it was in the article on combating xenophobia) there is no question 
that liberal identities in 2010 are given greater weight. In addition to searching for statements 
reflective of identity and the majority being decidedly liberal (64%, even if one was to not 
include villianization of statist rhetoric as being indicative of an endorsement of liberal rhetoric), 





Table 12: Phrase Usages 
 
Word/phrase 2006 occurrences 2010 occurrences  
Totalitarian  none 14 
Liberal (used as an ideology) 1 15 
Human rights 18 45 
Terror 46 38 
Corruption 8 23 
Modernization none 41 
 
 Many of these yielded the expected value changes. ―Totalitarian‖ was used specifically as 
a description of the Soviet past (in particular the Stalinist past) repeatedly in 2010, mirroring its 
usage style in the West, whereas the phrase did not appear once in 2006. Coverage of liberal 
topics such as human rights and, in particular, modernization rose dramatically in 2010.  Less 
conclusive were looks at ―terror‖ (which I presumed would reflect statist identity in focusing on 
combating threats to order and stability with a security-first focus), which declined only 
marginally, and ―corruption.‖ While reputations paint the statist and the siloviki as either at the 
heart of the corruption problem at worst, or at best ineffective at solving it and likely to ignore it 
and lead the country towards stagnation, in reality there was still an acknowledgement of 
corruption as a societal problem in 2006. While the instances of the usage of the word rose 
somewhat in 2010, the overall focus does not serve to indicate a dramatic shift in focus in terms 
of rhetoric, despite the Medvedev administration and liberals in general faring better in terms of 
their reputations on tackling corruption.  
 In addition to usages of significant phrases, tag descriptions were also analyzed. Tags are 
phrases which can be used to search for similar articles on the same topic. For example, ―UN‖ as 
a tag is used to categorize and seek out articles based on the UN. How stories are accessed and 
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how they can be searched could reflect that RT views the subject as relevant enough to merit 
categorization. In particular many of the tags added after the Medvedev administration came to 
power seem to reveal a curious pattern in that many of the additions in the later period were of 
subjects presumed to be more often addressed by a liberal identity: 
 
Table 13: Tag Usages 
 
Tags introduced before Medvedev presidency Tags introduced after Medvedev presidency 
Politics Crime (late 2008) 
USA UN (late 2008) 
Human rights Protest (early 2009) 
Military Law (mid-2009)  
Europe Modernization (late 2009) 
Conflict Corruption (mid-2010) 
 
 That an increase in liberal identity seems to be on the rise from 2006 to 2010 is certainly 
reflected in an increase in liberal rhetoric on the part of state-owned RT. In addition to furthering 
a worldview, RT, without embarrassment, often times lavished praise on elites such as with the 
following statement: 
“Whether you agree with him or not, it cannot be denied that Putin is a crowd pleaser. Indeed, 
he is one of the few politicians on the world stage capable of holding an audience‟s rapt 
attention for hours on end. His profound knowledge of every subject, peppered with his saucy 
wit, has a way of keeping a person on the edge of their seat, not wanting to miss the next 
colorful utterance.”217  
RT also villainized international Others, at times bordering on parody. One article titled 
―Kosovo Liberation Army accused of organ trafficking‖
218
 managed to incorporate murder, 
kidnapping, heroin, and human farming of organs all into one article. Both glamorization of state 
officials and demonization of international (and domestic) Others were common (though this 
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statement could certainly be said of Western presses as well). Similar to this notion of RT as the 
state‘s cheerleader (and denouncer), RT also played the role of the state‘s mirror in terms of its 
identity. That a shift towards liberal rhetoric occurred in 2010 is difficult to argue against, and 
supports the hypothesis that increased dominance by the civiliki, and in turn the increased 
preponderance of liberal identity that came with it, caused the Russian state to view Belarus 
increasingly as an old Soviet relic rather than as a viable partner for bilateral relations. In fact, 
this concept was repeatedly used by RT in reference to a growing chasm between the two states. 
 This rhetoric then grew into policy as RT began efforts to interview and highlight the 
Belarusian opposition during the Belarusian presidential election of 2010. While in 2006 the gas 
wars that erupted between Russia and Belarus certainly caused a degradation in relations, within 
months of the disagreement relations had been mended and RT had gone back to defending 
Lukashenko from attacks coming from the West. However, in 2009 when gas and milk 
disagreements erupted there was no mending process, and rhetoric went from bad to worse, up to 
and including tacit support for regime change by the end of 2010. Noncompliance on the part of 
Belarus did not change RT reporting in 2006, while by 2010 RT reporting had changed 
completely in its tone, illustrating that changes in RT reporting were reflective of more than 
simply punishing a noncompliant state.  
The support of opposition liberal candidate Romanchuk (who garnered only 2% of the 
vote according to the Belarusian results) was likely not reflective of delusions on the part of the 
Russian elite as to thinking they could unseat Lukashenko is his own managed elections. 
However, the concept of giving light to opposition candidates (when before they were ignored or 
demonized outright) is noteworthy, as is RT‘s attempt to discredit the legitimacy of the 
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Belarusian government by extensive coverage of the elections as being fraudulent. Not only were 
the critiques based on a de-legitimization of Lukashenko‘s regime, but the critiques specifically 
favored a liberal slant, and this liberal identity-focus is supported by the fact that liberal rhetoric 
increased in 2010 not only in relation to Belarus, but also in terms of how the state 
communicated in general. This statist-to-liberal tendency was also reflected in RIA Novosti‘s 
Russian-language reporting. 
Table 14: Rhetorical Breakdown for Russian-Language Articles 
 
 2006 (5 total statements) 2010 (10 total statements) 
Liberal rhetoric 20% (1 statement) 70% (7 statements) 
Statist rhetoric 80% (4 statements) 30% (3 statements) 
 Each day of December the stories under the politics category that were closest to 9:00 
am, 12:00 pm, and 6:30 pm were analyzed, in order to sample stories that would typically run in 
the busiest news periods (morning, afternoon, and evening) of each day.  In 2006 a total of 93 
articles were analyzed, while in 2010 a total of 90 articles were analyzed. From these articles 
a total of 15 identity statements were identified (5 for 2006, 10 for 2010). The data exhibits a 
similar statist-to-liberal-majority pattern that was present in RT reporting. The tables below 








Table 15: 2006 Russian-Language Rhetorical Usages 
 
Topic in question Liberal instances Statist instances 
Security B (1) none 
Economic modernization none none 
Multipolarity none none 
Views of the West none B (1) 
Soviet past none none 
Lateralism in negotiations none BB (2) 
Focus on social power none none 
Domestic opposition none none 
Social mobilization none B (1) 
Pragmatism N/A none 
 
Table 16: 2010 Russian-Language Rhetorical Usages 
 
Topic in question Liberal instances Statist instances 
Security BB (2) B (1) 
Economic modernization B (1) none 
Multipolarity none none 
Views of the West none A (1) 
Soviet past none B (1) 
Lateralism in negotiations none none 
Focus on social power B (1) none 
Domestic opposition AA (2) none 
Social mobilization A (1) none 
Pragmatism N/A none 
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One notable difference between the English-language and Russian-language reporting is 
the absence of articles covering multilateralism, often lacking articles about the UN even in the 
descriptive sense. This process could reflect the fact that domestic reports focus on the local 
issues and are more likely to instead cover descriptive-articles that focus on bilateral relations. 
An example would be an article describing negotiations between Russia and Finland for each 
country introducing language requirements in primary schools in order to dissuade ethnic 
segregation. Overall the similarities in identity-patterns between English and Russian language 
reporting reflect that RT is indeed indicative of broader identity patterns, and not overly 
impacted by rhetorical posturing simply intended for an international audience. Despite the 
evidence that identity did in fact play a role in the deteriorating relations between Russia and 
Belarus, it would also help to look at alternate explanations-- how else did 2010 differ so 
fundamentally from 2006 in terms of Russian-Belarusian relations? 
 
Alternate Hypothesis 1: Gazprom As Foreign Policy Monopolizer 
 
 Up until this point I have argued in favor of identity playing a key role in the sudden shift 
from the Russian media discrediting Belarusian opposition in 2006 to covering the opposition in 
2010 and attempting to delegitimize the rule of Lukashenko. However, one common theme 
through the time line of Russian-Belarusian relations has been conflicts over gas prices and 
deliveries. The wrangling over gas prices necessitates looking at Gazprom as a potentially 
monopolistic economic actor which merges state and corporate interests. Therefore, a closer 
examination of this study‘s time line (see appendix A) suggests one possible alternate 
explanation for the deteriorating relations in 2010. Though the opaque nature of Russia‘s gas 
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wars and Gazprom‘s workings make gathering data extremely difficult (even specialist scholars 
have told me this in private), it may nevertheless be useful to organize the data that is available. 
 
Table 17: Gas Prices 
 
Time period $ price (for Belarus) per 1000 cubic 
meters  
$ price for Ukraine per 1000 
cubic meters 
Pre-2004 $27 $50 
2004-2006 $46 $95 as of the end of 2005, down 
from the $250 that was 
demanded (equal to Europe‘s 
price) when Yushchenko was 
elected 
Mid-2006 3-4 (depending on source) times 
higher than $46 (so $138-$184) 
No data available 
December 2006 $100 + acquiring 50% of 
Beltransgaz for $2.5 billion 
Ukraine agrees to pay $130 
starting in 2007 
Start of 2008 $119, and by the first quarter of 
2009 the figure has risen to $148,
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$180, but by 2009 Ukraine 
offers $235 and Gazprom 
demands $250 before gas is 
shut off in January. Price 
stabilizes at $334 before 2010 
begins, Europe meanwhile pays 
about $500 (market price) for 
the sake of comparison 
May 2010 $150, though it is implied Belarus 
could pay ―domestic prices‖ if 
Beltransgaz is given to Gazprom 
In April of 2010 Medvedev cuts 
price down to $230, in 
exchange for Russia 
maintaining its base at 
Sevastopol, by June the price is 
given as $234 
First half of 2011 $280 No data available 
End of 2011 $164, in exchange acquiring 100% 
of Beltransgaz for $2.5 billion. For 
comparison, Germany pays between 




No data available 
 
The core assumption of this hypothesis is relatively straightforward; elites within 
Gazprom seek to maximize profits for themselves and that necessitates a coercive (and at times 
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confrontational) policy towards Belarus in order to force payments out of the Belarusian 
government. Under this scenario the Russian media, as just another asset controlled by elites, 
serves as an instrument of coercion, and the demonization of Lukashenko is the punishment 
when Lukashenko does not act according to Gazprom‘s wishes. According to this hypothesis, 
negative RT coverage may reflect Gazprom‘s sanctions against Belarus for refusing to sell 
Beltransgaz to Gazprom. In this circumstance coercion of Belarus was necessary for several 
reasons. First, Belarus (as a neo-Soviet state) could leverage its identity to ensure that the 
Kremlin (and by extension, Gazprom) would subsidize its economy. Second, because Belarus 
held a strategic position (acting as a bridgehead to Europe), it was invaluable as a zone of control 
for elites. While political control might be served well by cooperating with the authoritarian 
Lukashenko, economic control is more difficult to come by and Lukashenko has been steadfast 
in rebuffing Gazprom‘s overtures to acquire the Belarusian company Beltransgaz, and he has 
been equally steadfast in getting cheap gas prices. 
 Of course the key critique of this hypothesis would be that alienating the one friend 
Russia has counted on in the region is not in Russia‘s national interest. The thought here would 
be that Belarus is too important of a country to replace Lukashenko with an unknown, which 
could breed instability, or worse-- could create a pro-Western orange-style-revolution in a 
country bordering Russia. After all, Belarus is the last remaining buffer state that stands between 
Russia and ―the West.‖ However, while it may appear on the surface that Russian national 
interests would appear to be a rational method of analyzing Russian foreign policy, this assumes 
that national interests in a complex and fragmented hybrid regime such as Russia can be equated 
with the concept of national interests in a Western democracy. In particular, this ignores the 
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possibility that Russian elites are simply not invested in furthering the national interests of 
Russia.  
 Dawisha posited [2011] that while in democratic countries a variety of interests and 
foreign policy outlooks are contained within a single institutional structure, Russia instead 
appears to be a picture of an increasingly non-democratic hybrid regime that must parrot rhetoric 
on national interest and yet is ruled by an elite who often seek personal enrichment, often at the 
expense of ―national interests.‖
222
 This assertion could potentially be flawed in that it assumes 
―national interests‖ as a whole are a static definition outside the scope of identity and the culture 
that defines those interests. Despite this limitation, the conceptualization of a kleptocratic elite 
acting in their own interests (rather than in the ―national interest‖) may help to explain the 
workings of Russian foreign policy, and particularly that of Gazprom. 
 Dawisha summed up her sense of the corruption endemic to Russia when she defined 
how Russian corporatism under Putin fundamentally differs from earlier forms of corporatism 
historically: 
“Where it differs from other forms of corporatism is in the kleptocratic way in which a closed 
circle of state officials, having suppressed both the market and democratic rights, begin to use 
their position as state officials to raid these newly-renationalized companies for their private 
gain. In this process, the rule became that the state nationalizes the risk, but privatizes the 
reward. Access to this closed group required loyalty, discipline and silence. Once within the 
group, officials can maraud through the economy with impunity.”223  
 
Her notion of Putin as ringmaster in this process was summarized when she stated that 
―key to their successful functioning‖ is ―their willingness to allow Putin to be the ultimate arbiter 
of any disputes, without using (and indeed undermining) the written law.‖
223
 Dawisha asserted 
that this phenomenon came into its own as the siloviki (with Sechin at its head), under the guise 
of the state, dismembered Yukos in 2003, with its key assets being transferred to Rosneft (with 
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Sechin chairing its board of directors), coupled with the fact that Putin had power to appoint 
allies in the government to chair these boards.
224
  
             Essentially this picture is one where Putin fostered a capitalism with the government as 
its barons of industry, an inverse notion of how Marxism painted capitalists as steering 
government. In many ways this system seems to marry the worst of capitalism (inequality) with 
the worst of socialism (bureaucracy and corruption), resulting in Dawisha‘s notion of a 
kleptocracy where reward is privatized while risk is nationalized. She briefly even applied this 
notion of kleptocratic elites to Belarus specifically when she stated: 
“Kleptocratic Russian elites also function to encourage Moscow to leverage equity shares in 
industries in debtor states from which they could derive personal benefit. For example, it has 
been argued that when Belarus found itself unable to pay off its energy debts, Russian elites 
pressured their own government to demand controlling shares in a number of Belarusian 
industries at depressed prices.”225   
 
             This coercion-for-Beltransgaz logic becomes nebulous, however, when applied to 
Belarus in this specific time frame. Belarus was in debt for gas payments as far back as 2006, but 
serious criticism in the Russian media (both in terms of RT and NTV) of Lukashenko‘s regime 
did not appear until 2008 or 2009. In fact throughout 2006 and 2007, at the height of the gas 
wars and when Russia was threatening to cut off all supplies to Lukashenko, RT media coverage 
still ignored Belarusian opposition and refused to attack Lukashenko‘s regime in terms of its 
method of rule. Media attacks both in RT and NTV started much later, at a time when battling 
over the full control of Beltransgaz by Gazprom was still in motion, but when the situation was 
at most equal to (if not less tense) than it was in 2006/2007. Furthermore, these attacks took 
place when gas prices were stable in the low-to-mid 100s. Nonetheless, one cannot discount 
entirely the idea that the hostile articles from 2008 to 2010 were simply the next logical coercive 
step (after temporarily shutting off the gas in late 2006/early 2007) when Belarus still refused to 
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sell Beltransgaz in order to alleviate its debts. Importantly, the pattern of debt-followed-by-
takeover-of-industries-abroad is fleshed out by Dawisha when she stated that 
“the pattern of using the power of the state to leverage both public and private gain is 
particularly evident in Russian relations in the former-Soviet countries. A pattern that has been 
widely used has been Russian state involvement in debt-equity swaps, in which industrial 
infrastructure is leveraged by Russian-state connected firms at knock-down prices as payment 
for sovereign debt. Not having sufficient liquid assets to repay their debt to Russia, the debtor 
states give Russia an equity stake in their economic infrastructure, usually at deeply discounted 
prices. Russia has shown itself adept at leveraging increased control over the energy-




This concept of Gazprom as an ―energy mafia‖ which blackmailed and coerced post-




 A large array of circumstantial evidence fits together to raise a concern that Gazprom 
could have played a key role in shaping Russia‘s foreign policy towards Belarus from 2006 to 
2010. Kleptocratic tendencies have exhibited themselves in foreign policy in the past and 
corruption is an accepted reality of Russian life in that Transparency International ranked Russia 
in 154
th
 place out of 178 countries in its level of corruption.
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 In addition to the prevalence of 




But when analyzing the particular time in question of relations with Belarus over the past 
five years, the issue with this hypothesis overall is one of ends. If the objective of demonizing 
Belarus was to coerce Belarus into selling stakes of Beltransgaz to Gazprom, we must look at the 
Russian media‘s reaction to the complete takeover of Beltransgaz by Gazprom, which occurred 
in November of 2011. Once the objective has been completed (the takeover for the artificially 
low price of $2.5 billion in exchange for subsidy-level gas prices starting in January of 2012) 
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there is little motivation to continue to attack Belarus in the media following November of 2011. 
Though there is the factor of organizational inertia at work here (in that shutting off the attacks 
may take time) so far there hasn‘t appeared to be any cessation or decrease in RT‘s negative 
reporting on Belarus. Indeed, as of January 10, 2012 RT released another critical article titled 
―Belarusian opposition under surveillance‖ with the normal liberal flavor of criticizing 
Lukashenko for his poor track record on human rights. This might either be a case of 
organizational inertia (since it has only been two months since the takeover of Beltransgaz) 
causing RT to maintain its hostile stance towards Belarus until the trickle-down notion of the 
need to cease media attacks reaches RT reporters, or the negative media treatment towards 
Belarus is not the result of Gazprom‘s foreign policy dominance alone. One might logically 
assume that a simple directive to halt negative campaigns, presumably, would not take an 
extensive amount of time to enact from the Kremlin through to RT. However, what may make 
being certain over this analysis even messier is that, at the same time that questions over 
organizational inertia on Gazprom as a foreign policy mover subside over the next few months 
following the accomplishment of taking over Beltransgaz, the factional dominance of liberals 
seems to be on the decline on some levels (more on this later). Thus an issue of controls seems to 
be at play for determining true causation. To look at another possibility outside of both Russian 
identity and Gazprom as a key economic interest group, we can now analyze bargaining 
approaches that might have been adopted by the Kremlin towards Belarus.  
 
Alternate Hypothesis 2: Bargaining Approaches And Russia’s Realpolitik 
 
 While a constructivist analysis could take note of the factors Russian identity could play, 
and while a liberal analysis like Dawisha‘s could take note of interest groups like Gazprom as 
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they are related to a potentially kleptocratic regime in contemporary Russia, what also should be 
taken into consideration is a realist analysis based on the material capacities of Russia. While the 
materialism promoted by Dawisha is centered on a small group of elites, a realist analysis would 
take the interests of Russia as a whole into consideration. While the interests of Russia as a 
whole are defined in the eyes of the beholder (and in this identity remains key), what can be 
independently verified are the interests of Russia as stated by Russian elites. In this there can be 
no doubt that a chief aim of Russia is to expand its influence in the near abroad in general, and in 
particular to gain recognition for the independence of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia following 
the 2008 war with Georgia.
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 The hypothesis that Russia bargained (with both positive and negative reinforcements) 
with Belarus in a bid to extract recognition of Abkhazia and southern Ossetia shares some 
similarities with methods in terms of the coercive kleptocrat hypothesis, though it importantly 
differs in who the primary agent is (the Russian state versus a kleptocratic elite). Also, while 
benefit for Gazprom could be one objective for the Russian state, it is certainly not limited to a 
Gazprom-only focus, in that recognition for Abkhazia and southern Ossetia could be a definite 
additional priority in terms of the Russian agenda.  
 Stulberg elucidated concepts about Russia‘s ―energy statecraft‖ when he described four 
separate factors that determined success (or failure) of Russia‘s energy statecraft if one is to 
subscribe to coercion as being a key element in foreign policy.
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1. Relative power advantages, though this factor cannot explain deviations of levels of Russia‘s 
success amongst CIS countries, in that Russia is significantly more powerful than all of these 
states (Belarus included).  
2. Asymmetric independence, which predicts that the level of bilateral trade between a country 
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and Russia would determine how much economic leverage Russia holds over that country. This, 
however, cannot explain Turkmenistan‘s subservience to Russia (despite having little trade with 
Russia) or Kazakhstan‘s ability to circumvent Russian hegemony and find oil alternatives, 
despite being heavily dependent on Russia economically.
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 Belarus can also be considered 
heavily dependent on Russia in terms of trade.  
3. Structural power, which looks at both identity (the less independent of an identity a country 
has, the easier it would be to coerce) and geopolitical structure (the more geographically and 
resource-dependent a country is, the easier it is to coerce). In terms of both identity (where a 
Belarusian independent identity has been squashed by Lukashenko since he came to power in 
1994) and geography Belarus is very dependent on Russia.  
4. Institutional strength, which looks at the strength of the executive to subordinate numerous 
domestic interest groups to national interests. Presumably a state like Belarus can easily 
subordinate policy to Russia‘s whims without any concern for institutional whiplash, since 
democratic institutions are very weak.  
 All four of these aspects of coercion point to Belarus being very easy to coerce on the 
part of Russia, in a realist-sense at least. This could help to explain much of the dependence on 
Russia from Belarus. However, it fails to explain why a country like Belarus, which should be 
easily coerced under this view, has instead resisted Russia so thoroughly on the issue of the 
recognition of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia. The table below catalogues all the shifts in 




Table 18: Belarusian Positions on Diplomatic Recognition 
 
Time period Position of Belarus on independence of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia 




September 2008 Lukashenko states that the issue would be addressed during the elections on the 28
th
. On the 
25
th




December 2008 A member of the National Assembly of Belarus states that Belarus will consider the 
independence of both regions in the first half of 2009
235
 
January 2009 Belarusian parliament states that a debate will occur on April 2
nd
 to decide the issue of 
recognition. Lukashenko has stated he will follow the lead of the parliament.
236
  
April 2 2009 Russia blames the EU for blackmail by offering Belarus admission into its Eastern 
Partnership program and for suggesting it would be denied access to Belarus should they 
recognize the breakaway regions, which is based on statements made to just that effect.
237 
Though potential EU/Belarusian rapprochement sours quickly, Lukashenko attempts to 
continue to use it as a threat against Russia for diplomatic leverage.
238
 
March 2009 Russia reportedly offers half a billion dollars for recognition.
 239 
In June Lukashenko 
publicly states that the offering of money will not buy Belarusian compliance.
240
 
August 3 2010 Lukashenko promises to recognize both regions at a CSTO meeting.
241
 On the 13
th
 
Lukashenko blames Russia for not ―meet[ing him] half way‖ in terms of offsetting what he 
would lose from the West if he recognized both regions.
242
 
2011 Belarus joins the Eastern Partnership program. Belarusian recognition still eludes both 
regions. Despite turbulent and ultimately unproductive relations with the Eastern 




 Despite all the declarations of an impending recognition, for years at a time Belarus 
delayed saying definitively that the answer was ―no‖ on the issue of recognition. It appears, from 
the events above, that Lukashenko designed to hold it as a wedge issue where he could reap 
benefits from both the EU and Russia. In the end, this tactic may have backfired since he resisted 
Russia and the subservience to the EU did little to benefit Belarus and did not achieve any of his 
chief aims (a travel ban on Belarus was reinstated in 2011 and has not been lifted,
244 
and little 
economic cooperation has been accomplished). A slight symbolic return to Russia may be 
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viewed under the context of Belarus (along with Kazakhstan) joining in calls for a proposed 
―Eurasian Union‖ (modeled on the European Union for post-Soviet countries) to be initiated by 
2015. Another symbol of cooperation may be seen in Belarus joining the Eurasian Economic 
Space, a common economic space between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia which was initiated 
at the start of 2012.
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However, if recent history of Belarus‘s tendency of vacillating between 
organizations is any indicator, this may just be another bargaining tool on the part of Belarus.  
 The earlier weaknesses of the aforementioned coercive model critiqued by Stulberg are 
deeper than just an inability to explain why Belarus would resist Moscow‘s ambitions. The focus 
on coercion (cutting off gas supplies for instance) lends a serious selection bias in that it loses 
focus on all the non-emergency coercion (or more broadly, ―strategic manipulation‖ to borrow a 
term from Stulberg) that happens on the day-to-day level. For instance; compliance based merely 
on precedent or based on the reputation of the country to punish, rather than a stated punishment 
itself creating the coercion. A focus on crisis diplomacy ignores the nuances of extended 
statecraft over a long period. It is for this reason why I have analyzed a period of both crisis-
levels (turning off the gas in 2006) and non-crisis-levels with a focus on RT‘s rhetoric. 
 The issue here is whether the consistency in RT‘s negative rhetoric towards Lukashenko 
matches the reluctance of Lukashenko to comply with Moscow and recognize the independence 
of Abkhazia and southern Ossetia. Presumably good-faith actions would be taken when the 
promise of a breakthrough is made (for example, when Lukashenko promised to recognize both 
regions in August, 2010). While Lukashenko‘s promise was made on August 3, Russia certainly 
made no show of good faith if one was to be made in terms of state media rhetoric. On August 5 
an article titled, ―Belarusians demolish the myth of their prosperity‖ was released deconstructing 
much of Lukashenko‘s propaganda concerning his economic accomplishments, and quoted 
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Romanchuk (the opposition candidate that would later be interviewed by RT) in efforts to 
dispute Lukashenko‘s assertions about the economy. On August 16, shortly after Lukashenko 
recanted that he had promised on August 3 to recognize the two regions, RT released an article 
titled ―Small chance for Belarusian president to change ‗inconsistent tactics.‘‖ While this 
refutation on the part of Lukashenko would mark the period where any RT-rhetorical-payoff 
would be closed, it is worth noting that at no time following Lukashenko‘s promise did RT ease 
up on its criticisms. If RT coverage did play a role in this bargaining procedure, they certainly 
gave no reinforcements to Lukashenko after his promise to recognize both regions. In fact, the 
consistency in negative reporting following 2009 seems to indicate a lack of bargaining, in that 
bargaining approaches tend to have both ebbs and flows during negotiations. On the contrary, 
RT‘s reporting instead illustrates an escalating sense of hostility that is uni-directional, and 
consistently increasing over time until it exploded in dropping quotation marks in reference to 
Lukashenko as a dictator, and embracing the opposition it previously demonized in its coverage.  
 This is not to discount the bargaining approach entirely, however, as it is conceivable that 
the rhetoric-card is possibly the last to be played, and that negative reporting continues on auto-
pilot until all objectives have been completed. Under this scenario the purchase of Beltransgaz is 
just one of many objectives, and until recognition of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia (and the 
probable removal from the Eastern Partnership program that recognition would entail) is 
complete negative reinforcements will be applied, in addition to positive reinforcements when 
appropriate. While the degradation of RT rhetoric does coincide roughly with the time that 
Belarus rescinded on promises to recognize the two regions (late 2008), the lack of a correlation 
between periods of a clear worsening of rhetoric (such as 2010) are not tied to actions of 
resistance on the part of Belarus other than simple non-compliance.  
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 In addition to RT rhetoric, an alternative focus is gas prices (table 17) and the correlation 
with bargaining for the recognition of the breakaway regions. One would assume, if there was a 
correlation, a lowering of prices would occur in conjunction with Belarusian compliance, or 
perhaps more accurately with this case, a rise in the price to punish resistance. In particular, 
considerations of April 2009 (when Lukashenko lapsed on his promised recognition date and 
revealed negotiations with the EU) and the start of 2011 (when Belarus joined the Eastern 
Partnership) could be useful. While exact measurements are hampered by data unavailability and 
secrecy on the part of Gazprom (as well as honesty regarding how much Belarus actually pays 
rather than what parties say they pay), the first quarter of 2011 (when Belarus joined the Eastern 
Partnership) is the highest recorded gas price, ranging anywhere from $270 to $280 (depending 
on the source). This figure is more than $100 higher than the second highest price, and while this 
correlation could be entirely spurious and difficult to isolate in that prices are shrouded in 
secrecy and constantly changing, it certainly could support arguments that gas prices are a 
bargaining tool for ensuring Belarusian diplomatic compliance.   
While the drop in gas prices for 2012 coincides with negotiations towards forming the 
Eurasian Union (yet another attempted project in the long line of projects that fosters a union of 
Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan) and the purchase of Beltransgaz, this period marks both a 
softening of tensions but also a period of theoretically greater Belarusian dependence on Russia. 
With Gazprom owning Belarus‘s natural gas supply and (the now active) Nord Stream allowing 
Russian gas destined for Europe to bypass Belarus entirely, Belarus is entirely at the mercy of 
Russia. Under these circumstances we might expect to see a Belarusian recognition of Abkhazia 
and southern Ossetia before the end of 2012, since Belarus now has little maneuvering room to 




Illiberal Pluralism: Russia’s Capacity For Change Without Democratic Means 
 
Russia is the case of an illusory leviathan. Russia offers the mirage of unity inherent in all 
authoritarian regimes that squash dissent. However, occasionally the cracks in the façade are 
evident. Despite Putin‘s authoritarian image as a leader directing a subservient bureaucracy, his 
seeming inability to prevent factional infighting indicates that he is the faction-manager, rather 
than a puppet master.  
               The non-democratic and bureaucratic tendencies of Russia‘s vertical power structure 
breed corruption, and this corruption may lead to state-capture by clans and the elite according to 
authors like Dawisha. However, this thesis seeks to illustrate that at root, beneath corruption and 
short-term economic elite interests, competing worldviews struggle to shape and influence 
foreign policy. This struggle is a non-democratic pluralism, where ideas compete not at the ballot 
box but amongst shifting factions, with Putin often acting not as an overseer but rather as a 
ringmaster. The real protagonist, therefore, is the circus around the ringmaster-- the circus of 
factions within the Kremlin.  
            Importantly, there is the notion that the clans are not united in their efforts to compete for 
resources. In 2007 this was expressed publicly with the Cherkesov war (see chapter III). This 
public outburst occurred in spite of Dawisha‘s notion of the siloviki enforcing factional unity by 
―omerta‖ (a mafia-linked word to denote a code of silence).
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 The problem is that this 
hypothetical omerta is an inherently shaky argument, because clan-based power supports a 
pluralism of elite interests. This occurs because clans are not centralized and tend to splinter 
based on the changing fortunes of powerful individuals rather than institutions. In addition to this 
decentralized world of clan politics, there is a simultaneous political centralization in that the 
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Kremlin maintains power over the democratic process, the Kremlin holds power over the 
regions, and the bureaucracy holds power over the economy and media. The result is a 
centralized decentralization of zero-sum interests, with an inherently conflictual center radiating 
its corruption outwards towards the periphery (in this case, the social-infrastructural power of 
Russian society itself). Combining this process with a weak rule of law (or ―legal nihilism‖ to 
quote Medvedev) only further exacerbates this condition. In this way Russian society at large 
begins to mirror the Cherkesov clan war in the Kremlin—powerful individuals struggling to 
swallow up all the assets around them, burning anyone beneath them or in front of them who 
happens to be in the way. The end result is a predictable one, creating one of the most world‘s 
most corrupt societies.  
In this sense disorder lies at the heart of Russian politics, rather than the simplistic view 
of a monolithic authoritarianism. This disorder creates grounds ripe for competing and divergent 
interests dependent on the individuals who steer and seize control of state assets. These interests 
are motivated by both financial-kleptocratic interests (as Dawisha maintains) in addition to 
identity-based conceptions. If Belarusian debt was used to leverage the Lukashenko regime to 
auction off Beltransgaz, what is less clear is why, once this goal was achieved, the coercive tools 
(negative media coverage) were still applied afterwards. What is the role of bargaining if Belarus 
is already incorporated into the mafia-structure through Gazprom‘s ownership of Belarusian 
industries? Clearly coercion is needed to motivate Lukashenko at certain times, while at other 
times cooperation may be in order. Belarus is not independent of Russia, nor is Russian foreign 
policy independent of identity. The shifting perceptions of Belarus are as much a reflection of 
competing identities within Russia as they are a series of zigging and zagging strategies designed 
to mold Belarus to Russia‘s designs.  
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While captured-state theory, with its notion of elites in interlocking positions both in 
government and in business, seems to fit well with Russian events over the last decade,
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 this 
theory only explains the rationale of the creation of such a state of affairs. It fails to explain 
Russian foreign policy decisions once this captured-state situation is realized. On this point, 
constructivism provides valuable insight by illustrating the ebbs and flows of Russian identity.  
 
Identity As A Shaper Of National Interests 
 
This thesis opened with a description of Mao‘s relations with the Soviet Union. 
Khrushchev once stated that, ―When I look at Mao I see Stalin, a perfect copy.‖
248
 It was because 
he saw Stalin in Mao that relations with a Stalinist China were impossible for Khrushchev and 
those associated with him, who were eager to turn their backs on a Stalinist Russia.  Shifts in 
identity had fundamentally precluded what was once a natural alliance that made sense both in 
terms of geopolitics and political affinity. Under a realist conception, there was little reason for 
the Sino-Soviet split to occur, and even more troublesome is that there‘d be a lack of an 
explanation as to why it occurred precisely when it did. 
                Ross argued from a realist position that Putin‘s post-9/11 alliance with the West was 
due to his realization that Russia was too weak to project itself and needed to acquiesce to 
American demands.
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 While this might provide an explanation for why Russia retreated in the 
early 2000s and hardened its position in the mid-2000s (due to windfall profits from oil revenue) 
and could even be used to explain a liberalization of sorts in the late 2000s (due to the global 
recession weakening its economy), it illustrates little about Russia‘s relations with Belarus. 
Under this logic a powerful Russia could afford not to depend on Belarus as a periphery state. 
Instead, in the mid-2000s, we see a Russia that consistently caters to Lukashenko, both in terms 
of support given to him in the 2006 election and subsidy-level oil prices. Likewise, a weakened 
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Russia in the 2008-2010 period should be more dependent on retaining allies due to a weakened 
economy, instead of the course Russia took when it distanced itself to the point of nearly 
abandoning Lukashenko entirely. While an economically weak Russia might insist on liberalized 
gas prices in order to fill its coffers, it wouldn‘t seek to alienate a key ally (by lending a voice to 
opposition activists) precisely when it needed Belarus the most according to realist theory. 
Clearly the realist position alone cannot account for Russia‘s varied policy on Belarus. 
Tsygankov outlined the limitations of realist and liberal theories
250
 when he stated that 
realists tend to ignore culture in favor of seeing an Other as a competitor to the realist‘s localized 
cultural universe (Huntington‘s clash of civilizations for example), whereas liberals see in 
globalization the development of an increasingly culturally homogenous world (Fukuyama‘s end 
approaching). Both schools are united in that they take focus away from ―identity and diversity‖ 
and tend to exclude a dialogue-creating/reciprocal process with the Other, where the Other is 
both a target for teaching and for learning.  This dialectical difference was nicely summarized 
when Tsygankov stated: 
“Both conservative and radical cosmopolitan writers tend to view cultural development as a 
worldwide spread of westernized modernity and its norms of nation-states, market economy, 
political democracy, etc., rather than as a dialectical interaction of diverse local 
communities.”  
 
              Likewise, this Western universalism cannot tell us much about Russia and Belarus. It 
might predict that these two alien authoritarian countries may or may not be allied, but it does 
nothing to explain why they may vacillate between the two positions. It might predict that Russia 
becomes more assertive with an increase in military and economic power, though it does little to 
explain why Russia would turn against the leader of a state that acts as a buffer between Russia 
and a hostile NATO. Examining the why of Russian-Belarus relations can shed light on these 
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issues, and is useful for answering other questions as well. It can answer why the Soviet Union 
drifted from China in the late 1950s, or what we can expect from a 2012 Putin presidency if 
Putin stays on as faction manager but the factions themselves stay in a similar position to what 
they were in 2009 and 2010. Alternatively, it can also answer what may happen if siloviki begin 
to replace the civiliki at the top tiers of government.  
Identity is not simply elites parroting what has been successful elsewhere. If this were the 
case, the Westernizers would still be hegemonic actors in Russia today as they once were in 
1993. After all, the United States is still the global hegemon, and efforts to emulate America  
complement the Westernizing identity that has been largely abandoned by Russians since the 
turn of the millennium. Instead the Westernizers exist only in fringe elements of society and in a 
disparate and repressed opposition at the elite-level, unified with communists and fascists in their 
lack of a cohesive message as opposition members. 
              Despite the inertia and tendency for organizations to avoid radical shifts in ideological 
schemas, shifts do occur as the result of formative events.
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 This reasoning explains the shift 
towards Yeltsin‘s liberalism following the collapse of the Communist Party from power, and the 
shift towards realist-centered foreign policy following the collapse of the liberal narrative with 
the enlargement of NATO and the economic collapse of 1998. It also explains the shift away 
from US-allied pragmatism following the invasion of Iraq, diplomatic betrayal regarding 
permanent American bases in Kyrgyzstan, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. These external 
shocks also could have increased the domestic need for a rise in the preponderance of 
siloviki/statist identities during Putin‘s first term. After all, it is important to understand that 
Russian foreign policy is not only shaped by identity, but that Russian identity is responsive to 
outside foreign policy pressures as well (particularly of great powers like the United States).  
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Identities change not only because of outside phenomenon, but because identity 
construction itself is a fundamentally dialectical process. Identity is not created in a social 
vacuum, but through the result of interactions with other states and communities. For example, 
from the primary hypothesis of this thesis one could explore an alternate explanation: that 
Russia‘s increasingly liberal identity made Belarus view Russia through an antagonistic lens, 
rather than only focusing on Russia‘s conception of Belarus as a Soviet relic of decreasing 
relevance. In terms of rhetoric, there is some foundation for this view of Belarus being alienated 
from an increasingly liberal Russia, since Belarusian propaganda consistently painted Russia as a 
liberal traitor just as RT painted Belarus as an authoritarian relic.  
             Hopf pointed to the concept of a Khrushchev bubbling beneath the repressed surface of a 
Stalinist identity, and a Gorbachev bubbling beneath the repressed surface of the Brezhnev era. 
Similarly, it is useful to look at what is repressed and censored in order to find competing 
worldviews that today‘s elite deem as dangerous. If we look to notions of the domestic Other in 
RT reporting in 2010, this Other comes in the form of nationalism. This process can be witnessed 
through RT excusing Zhirinovsky‘s popularity through stating that people simply like him on a 
personal level, or through multiple stories in which authorities are encouraged to squash 
nationalist gatherings, or through the fact that these activists are routinely described as 
―criminals‖ (just as Stalin described counter-revolutionaries in the 1930s). At the very least, this 
points to the notion that nationalism is viewed by elites as being dangerous to the point that it 
must be discredited from the top-down in order to transmit the right message to the masses. 
Though the Eurasianist/nationalist identity is not widely popular, it may be growing in intensity 
among a small minority of Russian adherents. In 2007 attacks on foreigners rose in tandem with 
an increasing ―patriotism and xenophobia.‖ This could perhaps mark an identity shift (at least 
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among the masses, if not elites) in favor of Eurasianism/revolutionism bubbling beneath the 
surface of contemporary Russian politics.
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 This would reflect a rationalization for why United 
Russia must usurp revolutionist sentiment through Potemkin parties such as the LDPR, and for 
why government media increasingly tries to denounce  nationalist sentiment. 
 
An Impending Shift Away From Liberalism In 2012? 
 
                Is the siloviki waxing? Chapter III covered the recent shifts in personnel that have 
occurred at the end of 2011. Liberal Kudrin has been ejected from government (and even joined 
the opposition protesting the December 2011 elections) whereas silovik Sergei Ivanov has 
recently been promoted, to effectively undo the demotion he received at the beginning of 
Medvedev‘s term. One might be tempted to predict, with the return of the ex-KGB man Putin to 
the presidency in 2012, a return to siloviki orientations, where tensions rise with the West and 
friendliness and oil subsidies materialize for Belarus. But I believe this reading of events would 
be an oversimplification, based on Putin‘s individual role rather than the systemic conditions he 
operates under. Thus, Putin‘s inconsistencies throughout 2000-2008 can either be read as a form 
of political schizophrenia, or can instead be viewed as Putin acting as a faction manager more 
than simply an autocrat. Putin‘s authoritarian tendencies do not change the reality of clan politics 
in which he is embedded. Putin‘s role as faction manager has been consistent, even after he left 
the presidency. In fact there is a likelihood that a Putin presidency may alter little for Russian 
foreign policy, if the factional dominance and the identity dominance it carries remain constant. 
If the events of 2008 (where changes did not solidify until approximately a year later) were any 
indication, we can expect any potential changes to come over the course of 2012 and 2013, as the 
next constellation of factional dominance manifests itself. Russia watchers should pay close 
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attention to prominent demotions and promotions to gauge which faction benefits from the 
reshuffling, and what that faction‘s dominance may mean for relations with Belarus (or the 
United States). Attention should be focused on if one faction in particular is benefitting from 
these personnel shifts, and if so, what that faction‘s dominance could mean for relations with 
Belarus (or the United States). Likewise, Russian media reports may reflect the calm before the 
storm: an indication of which way future foreign policy winds may blow. A dramatic increase in 
statist formulations could indicate a swinging of the pendulum towards a more confrontational 
foreign policy, presumably one that would tend to see Belarus as a realpolitik ally.  
               Nord Stream was inaugurated on November 8
th
, 2011. Currently (with one of the two 
pipelines operational) it has the capacity to deliver 27.5 billion cubic meters of gas annually, 
though this will double by the time the second pipeline is completed (presumably sometime in 
2012).
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 Nord Stream runs from Vyborg (near St. Petersburg), through the Baltic, and directly 
into Germany. This Gazprom venture intends to ship gas directly to Western Europe without 
crossing either Poland, Ukraine, or Belarus. This essentially will lessen the need for Russia to 
rely on these countries and eliminates the need to bargain with them in order to obtain low transit 
fees. While Belarus putting forward the idea of transit fees (only to later retract the notion once 
Russia conceded more favorable export duty prices to Belarus) was a diplomatic weapon in the 
arsenal of Belarus in the past, that weapon is now virtually useless.  The bait of Beltransgaz, now 
that Gazprom owns the company, has been taken away as a Belarusian diplomatic weapon as 
well. In the end, if siloviki are promoted to top positions once again and the Belarusian capacity 
to resist Russian demands is lessened (as it presumably has been with these two events), one can 
expect a rapprochement to blossom between the two countries. Under these circumstances, 
Russia would appear poised to remain in the driver‘s seat in its relations with its ―brother-state.‖   
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September 1993 - Prime Ministers of Russia and Belarus sign an accord on monetary union 
within the CIS 
January 1994 – Belarus‘s leader Stanislau Shushkevich (who was opposed to the CIS union) is 
ousted with a vote of 209-36. With his removal efforts to reintegrate with Russia are 
considerably increased. By April a monetary and customs union is introduced between the two 
countries. 
July 1994 – Lukashenko becomes president of Belarus by getting 45.1% of the vote on a populist 
platform, trouncing leading contender Vyachaslau Kebich, who only attained 17.4% of the vote. 
1995 – Russian (rather than Belarusian) opposition stalls the accord.
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 This, however, does not 
prevent a broad treaty of friendship to be signed by the presidents of Belarus and Russia in 
February. Russia‘s reluctance to lift trade barriers bottlenecks the ability for any economic 
integration.  Part of the treaty stipulates that Russia can retain its military presence in Belarus 
until 2010 and can use their air defense facilities free of charge. 




March 1996 – Principal agreement to establish a Community of Russia and Belarus is signed. 
Russia writes off a billion dollars in debt and gives Belarus subsidies in the form of domestic gas 
prices. This price difference amounts to over one billion dollars a year for Belarus.
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Start of 1996 – The height of liberal/oligarchic domination over Russian society before its 
imminent decline, according to Yakovlev.
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 It is assumed that the proposed union of Belarus 




1997 – The ―Community‖ becomes the ―Union of Sovereign Republics‖ 
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1998 – Ruble collapses. Russian economy (under liberal leadership) collapses. Oligarch/liberal 
clans wage war between each other in an effort to seize assets following the collapse. Ironically, 
bureaucratic wars between the elite at times resemble genuine pluralism in politics to the 
observer.
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 Primakov (realist) is elected as Foreign Minister and steers country away from 
Yeltsin‘s/Kozyrev‘s liberal foreign policy. 
1999 – NATO attacks Yugoslavia. It has been argued that NATO‘s support of a Kosovan 
periphery over the Serbian center effectively destroyed liberal sentiment in Russia, since liberal 
discourses were the only ones that rejected the need to exert control over the uncivilized 




1999 – Confederal Russian-Belarusian state is proclaimed 
2000 – Boris Berezkovsky, who alongside Vladimir Gusinsky, was an oligarch who controlled 




September 11 2001 – Terrorist attacks on America are followed by America (with Russian 
approval) setting up bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to aid in the invasion of Afghanistan. 
This position is unpopular among both elites and the masses in Russia, but Putin proceeds with 
it. Russia and America begin to cooperate on anti-terrorism efforts.  




September 2001 – The election that Europeans regarded as ―unfair and fraudulent‖ is supported 
by Putin when he calls to congratulate Lukashenko on his ―convincing victory.‖
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 Unlike 
previous elections, this time Lukashenko is bolstered by visits from Kremlin officials while 
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Russian media covers him favorably on a consistent basis.
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August 2002 – Putin suggests that Belarus should join Russia in forming six different regions 
(destroying the idea of an equal confederacy that Lukashenko desired). Lukashenko refuses.  
Late 2002 – Following the Afghanistan war, America states that it will keep bases in Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan. America withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to start 
building missile defense systems that are seen as a threat to Russia. US starts to send military 
advisors to Georgia.  
2003-2004 – Yukos oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky comes under attack by Putin administration.  
2003-2004 – Russia pushes Belarus to privatize industries in the petrochemical/gas transit 
sectors. Threats are made to hike prices if state-companies are not privatized.  
February 2003 – Russia proposes creating Common Economic Space (CES) consisting of 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan with a goal of eliminating trade barriers and having 
shared energy transport policies.
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April 2003 – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia form the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Pledges are made to pool resources to fight 
terrorism.  
November 2003 – Rose Revolution begins in Georgia. Anti-Russian politician Mikheil 
Saakashvili becomes the new leader in the spring of 2004.  
February 2004 – Tensions peak when Gazprom cuts off supplies for a single day. Belarus agrees 
months later to a price hike from 27 to 46 dollars per thousand cubic meters. Lukashenko turns 
the situation to his benefit when he portrays himself as an independence fighter against Russian 
oligarchs (a code word for liberal businessmen in Russian politics).
146 
A deal is signed stipulating 
that subsidization prices will continue, but Gazprom must have a greater stake in Belarusian 
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pipeline company Beltransgaz.  
September 2004 – Beslan Crisis occurs in Russia. Lukashenko states, in order to keep Belarus 
peaceful and free from such terrorism, his term limits must be removed. The Kremlin silences 
critics of Belarus throughout the media, congratulates Lukashenko on the referendum‘s victory.  
October 2004 – Another election occurs in Belarus, this time in regards to a referendum which 
essentially gives Lukashenko unlimited power. Putin again calls to congratulate Lukashenko on 
his electoral victory.
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 Sergei Ivanov states, in response to Condoleezza Rice meeting with 
opposition candidates, that: ―we would not, of course, be advocating what some people call 
regime changes anywhere… We think the democratic process, the process of reform cannot be 
imposed from the outside.‖
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Late 2004 – Orange Revolution occurs in Ukraine. Russia agrees to give Belarus discounted gas 
prices for at least another year. By Spring of 2005 the Tulip Revolution occurs in Kyrgyzstan. 
2005-2007 – Russia actively tries to undermine OSCE observer missions to support its 
―authoritarian axis‖ and halt further color revolutions that are seen as funded by the West. Media 
spin supports these governments as well, usually under the guise of anti-terrorism. In May 2005 
siloviki strongman and FSB leader Patrushev (allied with the Sechin clan) ―unmasked‖ a plot by 
the West to use terrorist organizations to finance Belarusian opposition.
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 FSB officers aid their 
Belarusian counterparts (the KGB) in getting leads on opposition activists who smuggled banned 
literature during the last election. Russian media discredits Belarusian opposition.
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December 2005 – Russia demands Ukraine pay a price similar to Western Europe (five times 
higher than what Ukraine paid in the past). When Ukraine refuses gas is shut off on January 1, 
2006. Three days later Ukraine agrees to pay $95 instead of the $50 it paid before the Orange 





March 2006 – Russia freezes Belarusian gas prices at $46 (a fraction of what Ukraine is paying) 
presumably to economically aid/buttress support for Lukashenko in his presidential election. 
Relations reach a high point as Russian media praises Lukashenko and discredits his 
opposition.
264 
Ivanov states that Lukashenko is ―the most popular politician in Belarus, whether 
you [the West] like it or not.‖
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April 2006 – Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan pledge to sign the first set of 38 documents for 
implementing the CES as laid out in 2003.  
2006 gas war – Gazprom states it needs much more than the $46 Belarus currently pays. This is 
not the first time that Gazprom has threatened to raise prices, as it occurred in 2002 and 2004 as 
well. The 2004 deal stated that Gazprom would have a stake in Beltransgaz and this would 
expire in 2006. Once 2006 arrives Gazprom offers to extend subsidy-level prices in exchange for 
ownership of Beltransgaz, which Belarus refuses.
151
 Lukashenko threatens a ―breakup of all 
relations.‖ 
December 2006 – Belarus reaches a deal with Gazprom just hours before the deadline of when 
Gazprom had threatened it would cut off the gas supply. Despite the deal, Russia imposes a tariff 
on oil exports. Belarus responds with a transit tax of Russian oil moving westwards. Belarus 
agrees to pay $100 (rather than a price ―three times‖ the original $46), in exchange for Gazprom 
receiving a 50% stake in Belarus‘s gas company Beltransgaz at the price of 2.5 billion dollars.
152
  
2007 – Ukraine agrees to pay $130 for gas in the year of 2007, with some politicians considering 
$160 as being acceptable.
266
 At the start of the year Russia briefly cuts off oil to Belarus. By 
mid-March however balance is restored to Belarusian-Russian relations. Lukashenko denies an 
alliance with a prominent anti-Russian Belarusian opposition candidate, Lukashenko signs 
numerous economic agreements in March, and in April Russia speaks of a $1.5 billion 
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―stabilization loan‖ to be given to Belarus.
153
 Lukashenko responds by saying that Belarus and 
―the brotherly Russian people‖ would stand together and face their mutual threats. By the end of 
2007 subsidy-level prices are still maintained. 
December 2007 – Belarus gets a ―discount price‖ of gas at $119 for the first quarter of 2008.
267
 
August 2008 – On the night of the 7
th
 Georgia attacks and invades southern Ossetia, first 
attacking Tskhinvali. On the morning of the 8
th
 Russia responds with artillery attacks of their 
own. Within three hours Russians have pushed the Georgian troops out of Tskhinvali. Russia 
then attacks Gori (in Georgia). The war will eventually lead to Russia bombing Tbilisi, Western 
countries supporting Georgia, and Russia pressuring its allies to recognize southern Ossetia and 
Abkhazia  as independent.  
January 2009 – Disagreements over gas debts and accusation of gas siphoning result in Russia 
turning off the gas to Ukraine. Eighteen Western European countries go without Russian gas and 
suffer a shortage.  
2009 – RT begins practice of regular negative reporting on Belarus.  
June 2009 – Milk war breaks out. Russia bans dairy products coming from Belarus. Lukashenko 
claims that the ban is political in retaliation for Belarus not recognizing the independence of 
southern Ossetia and Abkhazia following the 2008 war in Georgia. FM Lavrov criticizes 
Lukashenko for not attending a CRRF (Collective Rapid Reaction Force, a CSTO organization 
which Belarus held the presidency of at the time) meeting. 
July-August 2009 – Belarus cuts off Latvia from Russian oil in July. In August Lukashenko 
travels to Moscow ―to restore ties‖
154
 though later RT articles show this attempt largely failed in 
that RT states that Lukashenko ―jeopardises‖ (sic) any breakthroughs or talks.
155
 
September 2009 – Belarus and Russia cooperate with war games known as ―Zapad 2009.‖  
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November 2009 – Lukashenko meets architect of the Orange Revolution (Yushchenko) in Kiev. 
RT paints the visit as an attempt to ―strengthen friendship against Russia.‖
268
 
January 2010 – RT stated that Belarus will receive ―no more preferential terms for oil.‖
269
 Russia 
cuts off oil to Belarus briefly before situation is resolved by the end of January.  
April 2010 – Medvedev and newly-elected Yanukovych meet in Moscow. Russia agrees to cut 
gas prices by 30% (by June down to $230) and Ukraine agrees to extend Russia‘s naval lease in 
Sevastopol.  
April 20 2010 – Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the authoritarian leader of Kyrgyzstan, is overthrown by 
protesters and flees the country with his family. He is granted asylum in Belarus and Lukashenko 
states that he may live in Belarus for as long as he pleases.  
May 2010 – According to RT Belarus is ―thought‖ to pay $150 per 1000 cubic meters of gas 
(though this is projected/threatened to rise in the near future).
156
 By the end of May Belarus 
offers Gazprom to fully take over Beltransgaz in order to sustain domestic-priced gas from 
Russia.  
June 2010 – Lukashenko orders Russian gas transit to be cut off from Europe until Gazprom 
―pays of its existing debt for gas transit.‖  
July 4
th
 2010 – State-owned NTV of Russia shows a highly critical documentary about 
Lukashenko, accusing him of dictatorship.  




August 2010 – Liberal opposition candidate who visited Moscow earlier, Romanchuk, is given 
full and favorable coverage by RT.
270
  
August 2010 – Belarus promises to finally recognize the independence of Abkhazia and southern 
122 
 
Ossetia. However, by October the promise was still not fulfilled.
271
  Meanwhile, Saakashvili 
(president of Georgia and Russia‘s geopolitical archrival) is said to be considering to invite 
Belarus to GUAM, viewed by many as an anti-Russian alliance.
272
 At the end of August, the 
Russian embassy is firebombed in Minsk. No injuries were reported, though a car was destroyed. 
On September 1
st
 Lukashenko suggests the attack was organized by the Russian government in 
order to discredit the Belarusian government.
273
  
December 2010 – Lukashenko is re-elected in Belarus. RT decries the results.  
November 2011 – Gazprom takes over full control of Beltransgaz for the low price of $2.5 
billion. For this Russia would charge $164 per 1000 cubic meters, starting in 2012 (down from 
the highest figure of $280, which was the amount paid in 2011). With the purchase Gazprom 









A sample article has been chosen to demonstrate the methodology used in choosing 
which statements were ―statist‖ and which statements were ―liberal.‖ Elements that were 
prescriptive/analytical for a certain identity (―the world would be safer if all countries worked 
together through the UN to enhance their mutual security‖) were counted as being indicative of 
an identity, whereas elements that were only descriptive (―in light of six party talks with North 
Korea, the UN has announced that...‖) were not counted since they were merely reporting 
events/decisions that had already occurred. The above two hypothetical examples both relate to 
multilateralism in the context of international institutions, but only the first would count as a 
liberal identity statement.  
In the sample article given in the page below, Russia Today lending a voice for a 
viewpoint is deemed as prescriptive, and specifically analytical in terms of how the world is 
interpreted. What is interesting in the chosen example is the specific highlighting of a discourse 
in the form of individuals (Putin and Medvedev). The concept of the Soviet past as a useful 
model and the concept of the Soviet past as an aberration from conditions in contemporary 
Russia are both given credence through Russia Today quoting Putin and Medvedev respectively. 
In 2010 this notion of ―endorsement through quotation‖ was at times inversed, when an 
individual who was painted negatively was quoted with a statement that was indicative of a 






Medvedev and Putin slam xenophobia
215
  
Tackling inter-ethnic clashes in Russia has been in the spotlight of the National Council, where 
President Dmitry Medvedev and Premier Vladimir Putin offered their vision of how to combat 
the problem.  
Putin suggested using Soviet experience and teaching Russians patriotism, while Medvedev 
called the USSR “a very harsh state” and said that it is impossible go back to its practices.  
“There were no such problems with inter-ethnic relations in the USSR. Soviet leadership 
managed to create inter-ethnic peace…The USSR managed to create some substance that was 
above ethnic or inter-confessional relations,” Putin said. “Unfortunately, it had ideological 
character. It was the idea of socialism.” What could replace that idea now, according to the 
premier, is raising patriotism.  
Medvedev, for his part, agreed that Russia does need new approaches. However, the idea of 
using Soviet experience did not seem appealing to the president.  
“[Putin] recalled the Soviet Union found its own way in achieving certain results in 
maintaining peace between nationalities. Is it possible to repeat what was done in soviet 
period? We are realistic people and we understand that it is impossible,” the president said. 
“But we do need to work out new approaches,” he added. 
What both Medvedev and Putin are unanimous on is that inter-ethnic peace is fundamental for 
Russia‘s existence.  
The tandem, as well as heads of regions, ministers and representatives of Russian political elite, 
discussed on Monday how to deal with xenophobia that has lately risen to a dangerous level.  
 
 Underlined section lends a voice to statist identity via boasting of Soviet past as useful 
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